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TIME TO DECIDE? THE LAWS GOVERNING
MOTHERS' CONSENTS TO THE ADOPTION OF
THEIR NEWBORN INFANTS
ELIZABETH J. SAMUELS·

Adoption in the United States is a complex patchwork of law and
practice that involves payments of nearly two billion dollars annually
in fees and expenses. The adoptions that involve domestically born,
voluntarily placed infants raise unique issues. In these as in all
adoptions involving parental consent, two generally accepted goals of
ethical and humane practice are first, avoiding unnecessary separation
offamilies by ensuring that birth parents make informed and deliberate
decisions and second, protecting the finality ofplacements. The two
goals are ideally complementary, but in the case of domestic infant
adoptions, there is a danger that pressure to increase the number of
adoptions is causing the second one to eclipse the first.
This Article surveys the present day "adoption market" in which
these adoptions take place and in which demand for adoptable infants
far exceeds supply. It examines best practices for conducting the
adoptions, reviews the state laws governing mothers' consents to the
adoption of their newborn infants, and evaluates those laws in light of
cases around the country in which mothers have sought, usually
unsuccessfully, to set aside their consents. Most state laws, in contrast
to the laws ofmany other countries, provide that consent may be given
and become irrevocable almost immediately after the child's birth.
Under the laws in more than halfthe states, irrevocable consent can be
established in fewer than four days. The Article concludes that the laws
of most states do not sufficiently promote mothers' deliberate
decisionmaking. It recommends laws that make it more likely mothers
will be offered skilled, unbiased counseling; will receive clear, complete
information; and will have adequate time to decide.

• Associate Professor, University of Baltimore School of Law; J.D., University of
Chicago School of Law, 1980; A.B., Harvard College, 1975. I would like to thank the
University of Baltimore Educational Foundation, which provided financial support; the
University of Baltimore Law Library for its superb services; student Sarah Bruce for her
outstanding research assistance; and the many birth parents, adoptive parents, and adoptees who
have generously shared their experiences of and their wisdom concerning adoption.
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I. INTRODUCTION

(1) The Act protects minor children against unnecessary separation
from their birth parents . ...
(2) The Act protects birth parents from unwarranted termination of
their parental rights. . .. The Act attempts to ensure that a decision by
a birth parent to relinquish a minor child and consent to the child's
adoption is informed and voluntary. Once that decision is made,
however, ... [it is] final and irrevocable. 1
Preface to the Uniform Adoption Act of I 994

Even as the senior justice on this court with fzfteen years experience as
an associate professor at a law school, I am allowed three days to
cancel a contract to purchase consumer goods signed at my home-a
document that is far less important than [an affidavit ofrelinquishment
by a newborn infant's young mother] and a setting that is far more
comfortable than a hospital. 2
Justice Tom Rickhoff, Texas Court ofAppeals
All successful adoptive families may, like all Tolstoy's happy families,
resemble one another. They each create a new set of lifelong kinship ties.
Adoptive families are formed, however, in many different ways. Stepparent
adoptions, the adoption of children from foreign countries, the adoption of
children out of foster care, and the adoption of healthy infants born in this
country are distinct social and legal events. We must acknowledge the
differences among these types of adoption in order to formulate sensible
policies and enact beneficial laws.
While children in foster care who cannot return to their families face a
critical shortage of permanent homes,3 the prospective adopters of voluntarily

1. UNIF. ADOPTION ACT, Prefatory Note, 9 U.L.A. 14 (1994); see also MD. CODE ANN.,
FAM. LAW § 5-303(b) (1999) ("The purposes of this subtitle are to: ... (2) protect children from
unnecessary separation from their natural parents; ... [and] (4) protect natural parents from
making a hurried or ill-considered decision to give up a child .... "); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-1100(b) (2003) ("The primary purpose of this Chapter is to advance the welfare of minors by
(i) protecting minors from unnecessary separation from their original parents. . .. Secondary
purposes of this Chapter are (i) to protect biological parents from ill-advised decisions to
relinquish a child or consent to the child's adoption ...."); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-101
(2001) (including, among its primary purposes, seeking "to ensure ... that [c]hildren are
removed from the homes of their parents or guardians only when that becomes the only
alternative [that] is consistent with the best interest of the child").
2. In re Baby Girl Bruno, 974 S.W.2d 401, 406 n.2 (Tex. App. 1998) (Rickhoff, J.,
concurring).
3. See 2 MADELYN FREUNDLICH, ADoPTION AND ETHICS 67-68 (2000); U.S. Dep't of
Health & Human Servs., Admin. for Children & Families, National Campaign Urges
Americans to Adopt, CHILDREN'S BUREAU EXPRESS (June 2004), at http://cbexpress.acf.hhs.

2005]

CONSENTS TO ADOPTION

511

placed "domestic white infants" have faced an acute shortage of available
children. 4 This Article focuses on the laws governing mothers' consents S to
the adoption of their newborn infants. Its focus is on mothers rather than on
both parents, not because the law governing the consent of fathers is less
important or less problematic,6 but because mothers' consents involve distinct
considerations and because recent scholarship has examined the law governing
mothers' consents much less than it has considered the legal treatment of
fathers whose children are placed for adoption.
Two principal and widely accepted goals of domestic infant adoption are
(1) preventing the unnecessary separation of family members by ensuring that
birth parents make informed and deliberate decisions and (2) protecting the
finality of adoptive placements. 7 Ideally, these goals are complementary and
can be balanced. There is, however, a danger of the second goal eclipsing the
first. Many state laws appear to value an increase in infant adoptions over the
goal of encouraging careful deliberation. Most domestic infant adoptions
involve powerful market forces as well as powerful emotional pressures,s and
they occur in the context of a national commitment to encourage adoptions of
older children and children with special needs. 9 Infant adoption service

gov/articles.cfm?article_id=819 (noting that 129,000 of more than 500,000 children in foster
care are "waiting for someone to adopt them").
4. See infra Part III.
5. The focus of the Article is on both "consent," the term commonly used to refer to a
mother's agreement to the child's adoption by designated adoptive parents, and
"relinquishment," the term commonly used to refer to a mother's surrender of parental rights
to an adoption agency that will place the child with adoptive parents selected either by the
mother or the agency.
6. A number of state consent laws treat either all fathers or certain classes of fathers
differently than mothers. For example, some or all fathers, but not mothers, are permitted to
consent to adoption before the birth of the child in Delaware, Illinois, Kansas, Nevada, North
Carolina, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, and Utah. See I ADOPTION LAW AND PRACTICE app. I-A
(Joan Heifetz Hollinger et al. eds., 2004); Nat' I Council for Adoption, Resources: State Laws,
at http://infantadopt.org/statelaws.htrnl(lastvisitedMay 10,2005). More significantly, because
mothers are usually identified and available, they are not the usual subjects of a whole complex
of constitutional, statutory, and case law that pertains to identifying, locating, and notifying
fathers.
7. See infra Parts IV-V.
8. See infra Part III.
9. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 673(a)(l)(8) (2000); 2 FREUNDUCH, supra note 3, at 73-76;
Annette Ruth Appell, Virtual Mothers and the Meaning of Parenthood, 34 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 683 (2001). According to the Child Welfare League of America (CWLA),
[w]ith the passage of the federal Adoption and Safe Families Act in 1997, renewed
emphasis has been brought to adoption, with federal requirements related to expedited
termination of parental rights, reasonable efforts to secure adoptive families for children
for whom adoption is the plan, and adoption incentive payments to states that significantly
increase the number oflegalized adoptions for children in their out-of-home care system.
CHILD WELFARE LEAGUE OF AM., CWLA STANDARDS OF EXCELLENCE FOR ADOPTION
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providers' livelihoods or profits generally depend on successfully arranging
adoptions for their primary clients, typically relatively prosperous, wellestablished, and socially favored married couples who have suffered agonies
of infertility and who, in their efforts to adopt, often face great difficulties and
pay high fees. lo Mothers in the stressful situations that lead them to consider
placing their infants for adoption are not an organized group and are relatively
powerless and socially disfavored. II
This Article surveys and evaluates the laws governing mothers' consents
in light of the numerous reported cases in which mothers have attempted to set
aside their consents. It also seeks to identify the legal rules that most
effectively create incentives for the kind of "best practices" in adoption
services that promote deliberate decisionmaking and finality-in other words,
practices that promote ethical and humane adoptions. The state laws that
currently govern mothers' consents to adoption of newborn infants vary
widely but fall into a few basic types. As a general rule, consents may be set
aside in all jurisdictions for fraud, duress, or undue influence, usually for
limited periods of time after consent has been given or after the adoption has
been granted. In the absence of such wrongdoing, which is difficult to
establish, 12 mothers in many states are afforded a limited opportunity to revoke
their consent. The state laws governing consent follow a number of different
patterns. Under a few states' laws, mothers may sign consents before the birth
but then have a brief period of time after the birth to revoke consent. Under
some state laws, consents may be signed any time after the birth but are then
revocable for a specified period. Under other state laws, consents may not be
signed until a specified number of hours or days after birth and are then
revocable for a specified period. A different group of state laws provides that
irrevocable consents may be signed at any time after birth. Other state laws
provide that irrevocable consents may be signed after a specified number of
hours or days after birth. 13
Many of these state laws do not ensure that best practices will be followed
in all infant adoptions. Evidence of this fact can be found, sadly, in what one
court has referred to as "the multitude of cases in which a natural parent seeks
to regain her child.,,14 These cases reveal an absence of the skilled and
unbiased counseling that would provide mothers with sufficient information
and support to make deliberate and final decisions. They also reveal a lack of
adequate legal advice. Perhaps most starkly, they highlight the very short

SERVICES FOR ABUSED OR NEGLECTED CHILDREN AND THEIR FAMILIES 4-5 (rev. ed. 2000)
[hereinafter CWLA STANDARDS].
10. See infra Part III.
II. See infra Part IV.
12. See Katherine G. Thompson, Contested Adoptions: Strategy of the Case, in 2
ADOPTION LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 6, § 8.02( I )(b).
13. See infra Part V.
14. In re Adoption ofBGD, 719 P.2d 1373, 1376 (Wyo. 1986).
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periods of time that are provided under a majority of state laws after which a
mother's consent may effectively be given and become irrevocable. IS In a
number of other countries-including a majority of European countries and
Australian states~onsent may not be given or does not become final for a
period of approximately six weeks. 16 In approximately half the U.S. states,
however, irrevocable consent can be established in as short a period as less
than four days after birth; in approximately ten percent of the states, it can be
established in less than seven days after birth; and in approximately fifteen
percent of the states, it can be established in less than two weeks after birth. 17
In Part II, this Article introduces the issues it will address by relating the
story of one recent case in which a mother unsuccessfully tried to revoke her
consent and contest her child's adoption. Part III surveys the present-day
adoption market in which domestic infant adoptions take place, and Part IV
examines best practices for conducting infant adoptions. After a review of
applicable state laws in Part V, Part VI analyzes reported cases in which
mothers have sought to revoke their consent. Finally, Part VII considers the
most practicable legal rules for promoting ethical and humane adoptions.
II. A CONTESTED ADOPTION
In a sense, the social and legal systems have failed in any case in which
an infant's mother asks a court to overturn her consent. If the first purpose of
adoption is to provide a home for a child, rather than a child for adults who
wish to adopt, and if the mother is not unfit and wishes to raise her child, how
are we to understand such a contest? If a mother has had sufficient
information, support, and time to make and come to terms with a firm
decision, why is she seeking to revoke her consent? What kinds of
circumstances lead to these contests? Some answers to these questions are
suggested by the facts of a recent case in which a mother unsuccessfully
pursued her claim through the Kansas court system and in a petition for
certiorari to the United States Supreme Court. How did her situation arise
under Kansas law, and how might it have developed in a different kind oflegal
system?
The mother who placed her child for adoption in this case was neither very
young nor childless. She was a twenty-nine-year-old pharmacist, a single
mother raising one child, when she became pregnant with a second. 18
According to the intermediate appellate court's unpublished opinion in In re

15. See infra Part V.
16. See infra notes 56-61.
17. See infra Part V.
18. In re Baby Girl W., No. 87,291, slip op. at 2 (Kan. Ct. App. Apr. 5,2002), ajJ'd,43
P.3d 902 (Kan. Ct. App. 2002) (mem. decision), cert. denied, Willson v. Catholic Charities Inc.,
538 U.S. 945 (2003).
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Adoption of Baby Girl w., 19 she became pregnant in early 2000 and sought
counseling at Catholic Charities. 20 During periodic counseling sessions from
May through July, she and a counselor discussed the possibility of-but did
not make plans for-adoption.21 The mother apparently felt like "the black
sheep" of her family.22 She was concerned about the father's lack of
involvement as well as how to tell her family she was pregnant. 23 A friend
told her in August that the friend's brother-in-law and his wife hoped to
adopt. 24 The mother spoke with the wife, permitted Catholic Charities to
speak with the couple, and later met with the couple on two occasions, but she
remained undecided about whether to place the child for adoption. 25 In late
September she had a brief meeting with an attorney provided by Catholic
Charities. 26 She was still undecided when she entered the hospital on
December 20. 27
Baby Girl W. was born that evening, and the next day the mother told a
hospital social worker she still had not reached a decision. 28 She expressed
concern both about her mother's disapproval of adoption and about her
attempts to reconcile with the father of her older child. The hospital social
worker advised her that foster care was available to give her more time to
decide. 29 The following day, on which she was scheduled to be released from
the hospital, she was told she had to reach a decision before five p.m., at which
time Catholic Charities would close for the weekend. 30 She thereupon
authorized the Catholic Charities counselor to come to the hospital to conduct
the relinquishment process. 31 The counselor, who up to this time had assumed
the mother had decided against adoption, arrived in the late afternoon;
discussed the mother's situation with her, including the grandmother's
disapproval of placing the child; and presented her with the paperwork, which
she then signed in the presence of a notary public. 32 That evening the adoptive
parents left the hospital with the child. 33 In court, the counselor testified that
the mother understood her relinquishment was irrevocable. 34 The mother

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

No. 87,291, slip op. (Kan. Ct. App. Apr. 5,2002).
Id. at 2-3.
Id. at 3.
Id.
See id.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 4-5.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 6-7.
Id. at 7.
Id. at 7-8.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 8-9.
Id. at 11.
Id. at 8-9.
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maintained that she was weak and tired from not having slept for twenty-four
hours and that she was affected by Percocet, the narcotic she was taking for
pain.35 She testified she did not recall whether she was told the consent was
irrevocable. 36
At home the next day, December 23, the mother decided she had made a
mistake and, according to her testimony, called but was unable to reach
Catholic Charities. 37 That evening she called the prospective adoptive parents
to say she had made a mistake and did not want to place the child for
adoption. 38 On January 3, a Catholic Charities representative signed the
relinquishment document, giving the agency the power to place the child and
consent to the adoption. 39 On January 26, the mother filed a petition to set
aside her relinquishment,40 a petition that she pursued unsuccessfully through
the Kansas courts41 and in a petition for certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court.42
If these circumstances had arisen before 1968, the mother would have
been able to revoke her consent at any time before the court granted the
adoption. 43 The Kansas courts had established this rule, as had many of the
state courts that had considered the question. 44 In Kansas between 1968 and
1990, under a statutory provision, she could have revoked her consent until the
adoptive parents filed it in court, unless she had acknowledged her consent
before a judge, in which case it would have been irrevocable. 45 During that
period, written consents, once filed in court, were revocable only if the
consenting party could prove before the final decree that consent "was not
freely and voluntarily given.'>46 Under the Kansas law passed in 1990, which
applied in this case, the mother's consent would have been voidable if she had
given it within twelve hours of the baby's birth, rather than two days after the
birth, or if she could have proved "by clear and convincing evidence that the
consent was not freely and voluntarily given.'>47

35. Id. at 9.
36. Id. at 9-10.
37. Id. at II.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 18.
40. Id. at II.
41. Id. at 24.
42. Willson v. Catholic Charities Inc., 538 U.S. 945 (2003).
43. See In re Adoption of Baby Girl H., 739 P.2d 1,4 (Kan. Ct. App. 1987); Harvey S.
Berenson, Survey ofKansas Law: Family Law, 17 KAN. L. REv. 349, 352 (1969).
44. See In re Adoption of Thompson, 283 P.2d 493, 498 (Kan. 1955).
45. Berenson, supra note 43, at 352 n.17.
46. Baby Girl H., 739 P.2d at 4.
47. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-2114, 59-2116 (1994). In a 1984 case, the mother gave her
consent the day of the birth and three days later told the attorney who was representing both her
and the adoptive parents that she wanted the child back. In re Adoption of Baby Boy Irons, 684
P.2d 332, 335, 337 (Kan. 1984). The court shifted the burden of proving voluntariness to the
adopters on the grounds that the mother was in a confidential relationship with both her doctor
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The legislature passed the applicable 1990 law in response to a 1987 case
in which an eighteen-year-old mother gave her consent before a judge at the
hospital approximately one hour after birth.48 In that case, the Kansas Court
of Appeals suggested that the legislature consider adding a waiting period
during which consent would not be valid. 49 In another case that arose after this
law was enacted, a young woman became pregnant while in high school, had
no counseling before she entered the hospital, and had no independent legal
representation, which is required in Kansas for birth parents who are minors. 50
She gave her consent twelve hours and fifteen minutes after the birth of her
child. 51 The next day she decided to revoke her consent and delegated her
mother to ask the prospective adoptive mother to return the child. 52
Ultimately, the Kansas Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's denial of her
motion to revoke her consent. 53
How might this mother's and Baby Girl W's mother's situations have
developed if they had lived in a jurisdiction in which the law had been
designed to ensure that mothers' decisions are well informed, deliberate, and
final? In the Australian state of Victoria, the applicable law falls near the
opposite end of the spectrum from Kansas law and the laws of many other
U.S. states. While domestic infant adoptions in the United States are generally
very costly for the adoptive parents,54 in Victoria adoptive parents pay only the
nominal cost of the court adoption order. 55 The prospective adoptive parents
do not have contact with the mother before the birth,56 and the mother may not
and the attorney and that there were suspicious circumstances because the attorney was the
doctor's daughter. Id. at 339-40. The court nonetheless found that the mother's consent was
voluntary, explaining that if she felt unduly pressured by the doctor's continual encouragement
to place the child, she could have sought medical services from another physician and could
have sought advice from family and friends. Id. at 341.
48. See Baby Girl H., 739 P.2d at 2.
49. Id. at 7.
50. In re Adoption of Baby Girl T., 21 P.3d 581, 585-87 (Kan. Ct. App. 2001).
51. Seeid. at 587.
52. Id.
53. See id. at 587,592.
54. See infra Part III.
55. Costs of domestic infant adoptions vary among the Australian states but are generally
a small fraction of the costs in the United States. For example, in Queensland, prospective
adoptive parents pay a $53 "expression of interest" fee and a $487.30 "assessment fee." Dep't
of Child Safety, Queens!. Gov't, General Children's Adoption Program, at http://www.
childsafety.qld.gov.auladoption/queensland/generalproglindex.html (last updated Sept. 23,
2004). In South Australia, the costs involved are a $379 "when lodging expression of interest"
fee, a $500 application fee, a $500 assessment fee, and a $250 fee upon placement. Adoption
& Family Info. Serv., Gov't of S. Austl., 9.3 Fee Stroctures, at http://www.adoptions.
sa.gov.aulSection9/9_ 3_info_ contact.htm (last modified Mar. 7, 2005).
56. EVELYN ROBINSON, CURRENT ADOPTION POLICY AND PRACTICE: A COMPARISON
BETWEEN NORTH AMERICA AND AUSTRALIA 2 (Jan. 2004), at http://www.clovapublications.
com/comparison. pdf.
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give legally binding consent until the child is fifteen days old. 57 After giving
consent, she has a twenty-eight-day period in which she may withdraw
consent, a period similar to the periods available in all Australian
jurisdictions. 58
A number of countries do not have revocation periods but impose much
longer periods than Victoria's before which consent may not be accepted,
periods ranging from six weeks to two months. France, for example, provides
for a period of two months. 59 Six weeks is the specified minimum period
under the European Convention on the Adoption of Children, which has been
ratified by eighteen nations. 60 When changes to the thirty-five-year-old

57. See Adoption Act, 1984, § 42(2)-(3) (Vict.).
58. Jd. § 41(1)(a). She may also extend the period an additionalfourteen days. Id. Other
Australian states and territories have similar periods for withdrawing consent. A Queensland
government review of adoption legislation reports that its revocation period is thirty days and
"[a]ll other Australian jurisdictions have a 25, 28 or 30 day (as in Queensland) revocation
period." DEP'T OF CHIlli SAFETY, QUEENSL. GOV'T, ADOPTION LEGISLATION REVIEW 73, at
http://www.childsafety.qld.gov.auladoptionlpublications/documents/cp_full.pdf (last visited
May 10, 2005). Queensland law provides that
an adoption order cannot be made if the birth mother signed the consent documents within
five days of giving birth, unless the Director-General is satisfied that the mother was in a
fit condition to give the consent. . .. [Nevertheless,] this provision is never used and
consents are not taken during that five day period. Most consents are usually signed
between 10 and 14 days following the child's birth.
Jd. at 69. With respect to other Australian jurisdictions,
[t]he period after birth during which parents cannot give consent is longer in all other
Australian jurisdictions than it is in Queensland. The most recent legislation, the Adoption
Act 2000 (NSW), states that parents' consent to a child's adoption cannot be given until
30 days after the birth of the child and 14 days after the person is given the consent
documents and mandatory written information. The New South Wales Law Reform
Commission in its Report on the Review of the Adoption of Children Act 1965 (NWS)
considered that: "a 30 day hiatus after the birth of the child will mean that birth parents
are truly able to experience the impact of separation from their babies, and ultimately to
make a more informed and realistic decision."
1d. at 70 (citation omitted).
59. COUNCIL OF EUR., EUROPEAN COMM. ON LEGAL CO-OPERATION, FINAL ACTIVITY
REpORT: ADOPTION 42 (2004) [hereinafter FINAL ACTIVITY REpORT]. Other examples include
Norway (two months) and Ukraine (two months). Id. at 61,82. Under Romanian law, consent
may not be given until forty-five days after birth. MICHAEL W. AMBROSE & ANNA MARY
COBURN, U.S. AGENCY FOR INT'L DEV. IN ROM., REpORT ON INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION IN
ROMANIA 15 (2001).
60. Council of Eur., Chart of Signatures and Ratifications of the European Convention
on the Adoption of Children, available at http://conventions.coe.intlTreatyIEN/cadre
principal.htm (last visited May 10, 2005). Article 5(4) of the European Convention on the
Adoption of Children provides:
A mother's consent to the adoption of her child shall not be accepted unless it is given at
such time after the birth of the child, not being less than six weeks, as may be prescribed
by law, or, if no such time has been prescribed, at such time as, in the opinion of the
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Convention were recently suggested in a report by the Council of Europe's
European Committee on Legal Co-operation, no change to this period was
suggested. 61
Under Victoria's law, Baby Girl W's mother, in addition to having had
more time, would have had to give her consent in the presence of a court
official or a person designated either by the government or an approved
government-funded agency.62 At least seven days before giving her consent,
she would have had to receive counseling by a person approved by the
Secretary of the Department of Human Services or an approved governmentfunded agency.63 She would also have had to receive from that counselor the
"names and addresses of organizations that provide family support services,"
as well as written information concerning "the effect of an adoption order" and
"alternatives to adoption. ,,64
To evaluate legal approaches as diverse as those of Kansas and Victoria,
and to consider what approaches best promote the goals of both deliberate
decisionmaking and finality in the United States, it is necessary to examine
"the adoption market," the standards of best practices in adoption services, the
variety of state laws governing consent by mothers, and the recurring problems
in practice suggested by reported cases around the country.

III.

THE ADOPTION MARKET

While adoption alters and hopefully enhances the lives ofchildren and
families, it is also a nearly $2 billion-a-year u.s. business that is
growing fast. 65
Sue Zeidler, Reuters News Service
People assume that adoption is a benevolent, philanthropic response to
the needs of orphans, but it's not always. In some ways, it's just

competent authority, will have enabled her to recover sufficiently from the effects of
giving birth to the child.
European Convention on the Adoption of Children, Apr. 26, 1967, art. 5(4), 634 U.N. T.S. 256,
available at http://conventions.coe.intiTreatyIEN/cadreprincipal.htm.
For examples of national laws, see Adoption and Children Act, 2002, c. 3, § 52(3) (Eng.)
(England and Wales, six weeks); FINAL ACTIVITY REpORT, supra note 59, at 31 (Croatia, six
weeks); ZdeIika Knilickova, Adoption in the Czech Republic: Reform in the Light ofthe Child
Welfare Laws, in THE INT'L SURV. OF FAM. L. 133 (Andrew Bainham ed., 2003) (Czech
Republic, six weeks).
61. FINAL ACTIVITY REpORT, supra note 59, at 10-19.
62. See Adoption Act, 1984, § 34(1)-(2) (Vict.).
63. Id. § 35(1).
64. Id. Under special circumstances, the counselor may decide that a period ofless than
seven days but no less than twenty-four hours is appropriate. See id. § 35(2).
65. Sue Zeidler, Internet Transforms U.S. Adoption Process, REUTERS, May 21, 2004.
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another giant industry in which people see a way to get rich. 66
Maureen Hogan, Executive Director, National Adoption Foundation
Infant adoptions in the United States are arranged primarily by private
agencies and independent facilitators. The infant adoption market is
characterized by high fees, demand for children that outstrips available supply,
and marketing aimed both at prospective adopters and pregnant women who
might consider placing their infants for adoption. Families that adopt infants
tend to have higher incomes than those that adopt older children and children
with special needs, and the families that adopt infants generally benefit more
from available tax benefits. The market features and the role of money in
infant adoption raise ethical questions related to the decisionmaking of
mothers.
Some adoption professionals and observers argue that adoptions should
be arranged, as they are in some other countries, only by public child welfare
agencies or highly regulated non-profit agencies. 67 In the U.S., however, only
three states limit the placement of children with unrelated adoptive parents to
licensed agencies,68 and even in those states parties can arrange what are in
effect independent adoptions by identifying one another and then using an
agency to handle the arrangements. 69 Adoption services providers in the U.S.

66. ADAM PERTMAN, ADOPTION NATION: How THE ADOPTION REVOLUTION Is
TRANSFORMING AMERICA 193 (2000).
67. According to the CWLA, for example:
Adoption as a child welfare service for children is best provided through an authorized
public child welfare agency or voluntary, nonprofit adoption agency for those children
who will not be raised by their birth parents and who can benefit from permanent family
ties established through legal adoption. Adoption services are provided by social workers
and other professionals, and encompass counseling for birth parents; assessment and
preparation of prospective adoptive parents; assessment, preparation, and placement of
children in adoptive families; and support for adoptive families, birth families, and adopted
individuals following adoption.
CWLA STANDARDS, supra note 9, at 9. The CWLA also advises that "[a]1I adoptions should
be completed through licensed child-placing agencies. Independent (nonagency) adoptions,
with the exception of adoptions by relatives and stepparents, should be eliminated .... " [d. at
130.
68. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-727(3)(West Supp. 2004); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.l3,
§ 904 (Supp. 2002); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 259.22 (West 2003) (providing that a court may
waive the limitation if it is in the best interest of the child). In Massachusetts, a licensed private
or public agency must place the child or must give its written consent to the petition by the
adopters. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 210, § 2A (West 1998). In Michigan, direct placements
with Michigan residents are permitted with the assistance of an adoption attorney or agency.
MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. §§ 71O.23a(3), 71 0.23d(b) (West 2002).
69. Lawyer Mark T. McDermott, former president of the American Academy of Adoption
Attorneys, notes that even in states that prohibit non-agency adoptions, "parties are able to
achieve what is, in spirit, an independent adoption: the adoptive parents and birthparents
identify each other without intervention by an agency and then arrange for the parental rights
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include public agencies, nonprofit and for-profit private agencies, lawyers,
physicians, and other "facilitators"-"a new breed of adoption entrepreneurs
who specialize in finding pregnant women for prospective parents.,,70 With
the Internet as "the main catalyst," there has been a "huge increase" in the
number of adoptions in which generally white couples and birth parents
identify one another. 71 Public agencies principally arrange adoptions of older
children and children with special needs,72 while most adoptions of domestic
newborns are handled by private agencies and by independent,73 non-agency
intermediaries. As the Packard Foundation's Center for the Future of Children
explains, "public agencies have been required to focus on abused or neglected
children waiting in foster care, while private agencies and intermediaries have
tended to focus on finding voluntarily relinquished healthy babies for childless
adults.,,74 Since 1970, according to historian Barbara Melosh, even private
agency adoptions have "declined sharply, in what amounts to a massive de
facto deregulation of child placement.,,75 Reliable statistics are not available
on the relative number of private agency versus independent, non-agency

to be relinquished through an agency so that the adoption becomes a 'directed agency
adoption.'" Mark T. McDennott, Agency Versus Independent Adoption: The Case for
Independent Adoption, 3 FUTURE OF CHILD.: ADOPTION 146, 146 (1993).
70. PERTMAN, supra note 66, at 36.
71. Id. at 37.
72. In 1998, in the public child welfare system, the median age of children whose
adoptions were finalized was 4.8 years and only 6.2% were younger than one year old. See
Kathy S. Stolley, Statistics on Adoption in the United States, 3 FUTURE OF CHILD.: ADOPTION
26,35 (1993). As of Sept. 30, 2001, of the children in foster care waiting to be adopted, 96%
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

See CHILDREN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE AFCARS REpORT,
at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/publications/afcars/report8.htm (last modified Mar. 28,
2003).
73. Definitions of the tenn "independent adoption" vary. For purposes of this Article,
the term refers to adoptions that do not involve either a public or a licensed private agency.
H. Joseph Gitlin defines an "independent adoption" as "a nonagency adoption of unrelated
child where the lawyer acts as a facilitator, or intennediary, between the parent(s) and adopting
parent(s) and the actual placement (choice of adopting parents) is made by the birth parent(s)."
H. JOSEPH GITLIN, ADOPTIONS: AN A TfORNEY'S GUIDE TO HELPING ADOPTIVE PARENTS 43
(1987). The CWLA uses the tenns "independent adoption" and "private adoption"
interchangeably, defining them as "adoption that takes place without the involvement oflegally
regulated agencies, often involving physicians, lawyers, or others who, for a fee, identify and/or
place a child with adoptive parents." CWLA STANDARDS, supra note 9, at 143. For an
excellent review of agency-facilitated and of independent or "private-placement" adoption, see
Jana B. Singer, The Privatization ofFamily Law, 1992 WIS. L. REv. 1443,1444,1478-86.
74. Ctr. for the Future of Children, Overview and Majur Recommendations, 3 FUTURE OF
CHILD.: ADOPTION 4,5 (1993); see also 2 FREUNDLICH, supra note 3, at 77-79 (discussing the
demographics of children who are available for adoption).
75. BARBARA MELOSH, STRANGERS AND KIN: THE AMERICAN WAY OF ADOPTION 288
(2002).
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adoptions,76 but both these types of providers are subject to limited regulation
and operate under a largely "laissez faire" regime. 77 As adoption law scholar
William M. Schur concludes with respect to agency adoptions, the "standards
which agencies must meet for licensing purposes are generally minimum
standards.,,78 As Melosh summarizes the situation, "after 1970, most
placements have been made as private agreements executed between
consenting adults, with minimal involvement from the state.,m
Indisputably, "many more families are seeking healthy infants than there
are healthy infants available for adoption.,,80 The number of adoptions has
dropped in the United States from approximately 175,000 in 1970 to 118,779
in 1990. 81 About half of adoptions are by relatives, most commonly
stepparents, and the overall proportion of adoptions of infants and very young
children has declined. 82 For every domestically born white baby, there are
approximately six would-be parents. 83 According to Adam Pertman, author
of the leading popular account of adoption in America today, "far more [than
six] want infants but don't try to adopt because they perceive the process as
too daunting and the costs as too high.,,84 Greater infertility rates, delayed
childbearing, wider tolerance of unmarried pregnancy, and increased
acceptance of unmarried parenting all contribute to the disparity between
supply and demand. 8s Delayed childbearing and rising infertility have led to
"a large number of infertile individuals" who "typically look to adopt
newborns in this country or very young, healthy children from other
countries.,,86
The imbalance of demand and supply, and perhaps the intensely personal
nature of the demand, probably account for some part of the increase in the
cost of adoption 87 as well as the periodic reported instances of adoption frauds

76. Estimates of the percentages of adoptions arranged by private agencies versus
independent providers vary. See generally McDermott, supra note 69, at 146 (stating that
"more newborns are placed each year through independent adoption than through private
agency adoption"); Stolley, supra note 72, at 31 (estimating that similar percentages of
adoptions are arranged by private agencies and independent providers).
77. PERTMAN, supra note 66, at 37.
78. William M. Schur, Attorney's Role in Private Agency Adoption, in 2 ADOPTION LAW
AND PRACTICE, supra note 6, § 7.01(2). But see Singer, supra note 73, at 1481, 1485
(indicating that while private adoptions "minimize state intervention," adoption agencies are
"heavily regulated").
79. MEWSH, supra note 75, at 288.
80. CWLA STANDARDS, supra note 9, at 4.
81. See JOHN TR!SEUOTIS ET AL., ADoPTION: THEORY, POUCY AND PRACTICE 15 (1997).
82. Id.
83. See 2 FREUNDUCH, supra note 3, at 8-9.
84. PERTMAN, supra note 66, at 34.
85. CWLA STANDARDS, supra note 9, at 3.
86. Id. at 4.
87. Judge Richard L. Posner has made the controversial claim that legalizing regulated
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and scandals. 88 A publication of the Child Welfare League of America
(CWLA) notes that "concerns increasingly are expressed that
adoption-particularly infant adoption in the United States and international
adoption-has been transformed into a service which has, as its core purpose,
the finding of healthy babies for adults who wish-and can pay large fees-to
adopt. ,,89 As adoption policy expert Madelyn Freundlich explains, "[a]lthough
'donative' intent may stand as the theoretical basis for infant adoption and may
have greater appeal than a pure market analysis, it presents difficulties in
actual application given the escalating sums of money involved in the adoption
of very young children.,,9o
In contrast to the cost of public agency adoptions, which range from zero
to $2,500, the cost of a domestic private agency adoption ranges from $4,000
to more than $30,000, and the cost of a domestic independent adoption ranges
from $8,000 to more than $30,000, or reportedly to as much as $50,000. 91
Adoption cancellation insurance is available to protect families against
expenditures that do not lead to a successful adoption. 92 Marketing to
prospective adoptive parents is prevalent by adoption facilitators and agencies,
as is advertising by both agencies and prospective adoptive parents seeking
babies. The author of Fast Track Adoption, a book for prospective adoptive
parents, counsels that "the most effective way to connect with prospective
birth mothers is to use direct advertising .... Couples who launch an effective

"baby selling" might increase supply and reduce costs. See Richard A. Posner, The Regulation
of the Market in Adoptions, 67 B.U. L. REv. 59,64-65,68-70 (1987). Contra Jane Maslow
Cohen, Posnerism, Pluralism, Pessimism, 67 B.U. L. REv. 105, 105-08 (1987).
88. See, e.g., David M. Smolin, The Two Faces of Intercountry Adoption: The
Significance of the Indian Adoption Scandals, 35 SETON HALL L. REv. 403 (2005); Hugh
Dellios & Bonnie Miller Rubin, Guatemala Delays Foreign Adoptions; Abductions Spark Push
for Reform, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 14,2003, at C19; Noelle Knox, Romania to Make Its Ban on
International Adoptions Permanent, USA TODAY, June 16,2004, at 9D ("[Romania] agreed
that the only way to end rampant corruption in the system was to end international adoption. ");
Maureen O'Hagan, Guilty Plea in Federal Adoption Fraud Case; Seattle Agency Woman Was
Praised as a Humanitarian, SEATILE TIMES, June 24, 2004, at B I (reporting that a woman pled
guilty to "visa fraud, money laundering and currency structuring, admitting that some
Cambodian children she had adopted out as orphans did, in fact, have parents"); Walter F.
Roche Jr.,
Enforcement Needed, Marshallese Official Says; Illegal Adoptions Likely to
Continue Despite New Law, Authority Warns, BALT. SUN, May 7,2004, at 3A.
89. 3 FREUNDLICH, supra note 3, at xiv (2001).
90. 2 id. at 16-17.
91. See NAT'L ADOPTION INFO. CLEARINGHOUSE, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., COSTS OF ADOPTING 1-3 (June 2004), available at http://naic.acfhhs.gov/pubs/s_
costls_costs.pdf [hereinafter COSTS OF ADOPTING]; Zeidler, supra note 65; see, e.g.,
2 FREUNDLICH, supra note 3, at 12, 14; PERTMAN, supra note 66, at 228; Gay Jervey, Priceless,
MONEY, Apr. 2003, at 119-24. For analyses of specific adoption costs, see 2 FREUNDLICH,
supra note 3, at 19 and COSTS OF ADOPTING, supra, at 2-4.
92. Art Adams, Adoption Cancellation Insurance, in ADOPTION F ACTBOOK III 477-79
(Connaught Marshner ed., 1999); 2 FREUNDLICH, supra note 3, at 20.
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advertising campaign can often reduce their wait by months or even years.,,93
Children in foster care who are available for adoption are advertised as well,
and individual children have even been featured on the Internet by their
parents or their parents' representatives. 94 To find potentially available
infants, adoption agencies use "billboards, newspaper ads, radio and TV
commercials, and even tray liners at fast-food outlets."9S Individuals and firms
help prospective adoptive parents market themselves to potential birth mothers
with advertisements, biographies, photographs, scrapbooks, videotapes, and
so forth.96 Social worker and author James L. Gritter reports that
"[ i]mpoverished pregnant women are unapologetically considered 'targets' for
creative marketing schemes.,,97 He "will never forget," he writes, "a comment
by a social worker from Nebraska .... 'People from the West Coast do a lot
of advertising in Nebraska,' she explained, 'because they view our expectant
mothers as com-fed, disease-free stock. ",98
F amities adopting independently appear to have higher incomes than those
adopting through public agencies. 99 According to Melosh, "[i]t seems evident
... that the market model of adoption has increased the economic disparities
between adoptive families and others."IOO Federal tax benefits for adopters
generally provide greater benefits to families involved in the more expensive
healthy newborn and international 101 adoptions, although the benefits are
promoted as a means to increase adoptions of children out of foster care. I02

93. SUSAN BURNS, FAST TRACK ADoPTION 21 (2003). She notes:
Although there is always the potential to spend an unlimited amount of money on adoption
advertising, those who spend excessively usually do so because they lack an effective
strategy. . .. [W]hen advertising is properly planned, it is possible to limit the total costs
to $3,000. In many cases advertising can be done for substantially less.
Id. at 25.
94. 2 FREUNDUCH, supra note 3, at 105-20.
95. RICKIE SOUNGER, BEGGARS AND CHOOSERS 125 (2001) (quoting Sheila Rule,
Couples Taking Unusual Paths/or Adoptions, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 1984, at 1).
96. 2 FREUNDUCH, supra note 3, at 106-07.
97. JAMES L. GRITTER, LIFEGNERS: FRAMING THE BIRTHPARENT EXPERIENCE IN OPEN
ADOPTION 56 (2004).
98. Id.
99. See COSTS OF ADOPTING, supra note 91, at 1, 3; MELOSH, supra note 75, at 289.
100. MELOSH, supra note 75, at 289.
101. Fees for intercountry adoptions are estimated to range from $7,000 to $25,000, but
these adoptions may include additional expenses such as parents' travel and in-country stays,
escorting fees, and foster care. COSTS OF ADoPTING, supra note 91, at 4.
102. F or example, in 1996 when House Minority Leader Dick Gephardt endorsed the tax
credit, he stated, "With 400,000 kids still in foster care in this country, now is the time to
provide incentives for families wishing to adopt. . " We simply have to make adoption more
affordable." Associated Press, Clinton Backing Republican Proposalfor Tax Credit to Families
That Adopt, DAILY RECORD, May 7, 1996, at 10. Similarly, a Missouri state tax credit aimed
at encouraging the adoption of children out of foster care instead supported international
adoptions:

524

TENNESSEE LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 72:509

The tax benefits even may have contributed to increasing adoption costs. In
2003, the maximum benefits increased to $10,160 for the tax credit and for the
amount excludable from income for qualifying expenses under an employer's
adoption assistance program, both of which can be claimed in full if the
adopters' modified adjusted gross income is $152,390 or less. 103 Freundlich
suggests that the tax benefits may have "simply served to increase the cost of
an adoption by an equivalent amount. . .. The rising cost of adoption may be
associated, at least to some degree, with the availability of such subsidies. ,,104
According to Pertman, who is now executive director of the Evan B.
Donaldson Adoption Institute, lOS "[s]ince Congress enacted a $5,000 tax credit
for adoptions in 1997, a growing number of practitioners have been raising
their charges about $5,000.,,106 Freundlich points out that "[t]he structure of
the tax credit does not benefit families who adopt children in foster
care-typically families of moderate means who incur few up front costs in
adopting but who may be in greater need of ongoing financial supports to meet
the special needs of the children they adopt. ,,107 Yet, she reports, efforts to
increase the tax credit have met with less legislative concern about fiscal
impact than efforts to increase the availability of adoption subsidies for
adopting children with special needs. 108
The role of money in adoption raises ethical questions with respect to the
impact on mothers' decisionmaking processes. As Freundlich frames two of
these questions,
To what extent do prospective adoptive parents' expenditures to cover a birth

A $2 million Missouri tax credit that many hoped would have encouraged families to
adopt the state's foster children is instead being used almost exclusively to help underwrite
the cost of adopting children from other countries.
According to a report released Monday by state Auditor Claire McCaskill, 90 percent
of the tax credits in 2002 went to parents who adopted children internationally.
And while McCaskill said she supported those kinds of adoptions, she questions whether
the tax incentive program was accomplishing its aim.
Matthew Franck, Missouri Auditor Questions Adoption Tax Credit, ST. LOUIS POST -DISPATCH,
Feb. 17,2004, at BI.
103. Both the credit and the exclusion can be claimed if they are claimed for different
expenses. Smaller credits and exclusions may be claimed up to an income of $192,390, at
which level the benefits are no longer available. lNTERNALREVENUE SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF THE
TREASURY, PUB. No. 968, TAX BENEFITS FOR AooPTION 1-3 (2004), available at http://www.irs.
gov/pubJications/p968/arO I.html.
104. 2 FREUNDUCH, supra note 3, at 21.
105. Evan B. Donaldson Adoption Institute, Who We Are. Staff, at http://www.adoption
institute.org/whowe/whosta.html (last visited May 15,2005) (a non-profit institute devoted to
adoption policy research and analysis).
106. PERTMAN, supra note 66, at 189.
107. 2 FREUNDUCH, supra note 3, at 21; see also PERTMAN, supra note 66, at 199-200
(discussing how adoption is increasingly becoming an activity for the affluent).
108. 2 FREUNDUCH, supra note 3, at 95.
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mother's medical costs or other living expenses create a sense of
indebtedness that may affect her decision-making? . .. Does a birth mother
ultimately "owe" it to the prospective adoptive parents to follow-through on
the adoption because a good deal of money has been expended on her
behalf? 109

Pertman reports that there are Internet sites on which prospective parents who
sign up with an adoption attorney or agency can receive passwords for chat
rooms and "receive instructions about how to use financial incentives to
persuade ambivalent pregnant women to relinquish their children."llo An
adoptive father explains, '" We were led to understand, in so many words, that
the more we gave her, the more obligated she'd feel to give up her child,
which she ultimately did .... ",III A woman who stayed in a Texas-based
agency's home for pregnant women while deciding whether to place her child
reported that "'they got you to the point of feeling like you were supposed to
give up your baby as the price of admission for all the generous benefits they
gave you. ",112
Another ethical question related to the decisionmaking process of mothers
is whether in the "adoption market," adoption services inevitably will focus on
satisfying the desires of the "paying customers," the prospective adoptive
parent "who is likely to be the primary, ifnot exclusive, 'client' because he or
she pays the fee for the services.,,113 The claim is made that prospective birth
mothers are increasingly powerful because they are gaining the opportunity to
select adoptive parents, but as Freundlich concludes, the mothers "generally
do not feel empowered in the adoption process," and the "adoptive parents,
because they usually bring greater social and financial advantages compared
to those of most birth parents, hold greater power with adoption service
providers.,,114 Adoptive parents not only pay high fees for adoption, they are
also the objects ofincreasing competition in an adoption marketplace in which
the number of service providers has grown rapidlyllS and in which those
service providers may be able to remain in the market "only if healthy infants
can be speedily provided.,,116

109.
110.
111.
112.

113.
114.
115.

116.

2 id. at 23-24.
PERTMAN, supra note 66, at 187.
Id. at 188.
Jd. at 197.
2 FREUNDLICH, supra note 3, at 26.
2 id. at 27.
See 2 id. at 33.
2 id. at 32.
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IV. BEST PRACTICES

Adoption ought never be organized as a proprietary tussle between
birthparents and adoptive parents. Rather, it is better understood as an
exercise in cooperation. 117
James L. Gritter, Adoption Social Worker
This Part examines the practices that characterize ethical and humane
infant adoption services, the kind of services that prevent unnecessary family
separation and promote finality. These practices fall within the areas of
adoption counseling, the structure of adoption services, the legal
representation of the parties to adoption, and the timing of adoption consents.
A. Counseling
Adoption professionals and most organizations involved in adoption agree
that counseling services should be available for women considering placing
their babies for adoption.IIB Laws in eighteen states require that some
counseling be offered, generally by an adoption agency, while another ten
states require some quantum of counseling services. "9 Skilled counseling, the
CWLA advises, helps provide assurance that "[i]nformed decisions will be
made by both the birth and adoptive parents.,,120 Counseling for parents, as
explained in a comprehensive guide to adoption practices, can help parents to
"own" their decisions, I2I that is, can help them feel "in control through having
a real choice.,,'22 Having felt as if she had a real choice is a factor associated
with "positive resolutions" for birth mothers, as is having an opportunity to
talk, to reflect, and "to anticipate future pain.,,123 Counseling for mothers
should include providing information about alternatives to adoption, options
within adoption, legal steps and consequences involved in adoption, and
possible effects of adoption on themselves and their children. Ideally,

117. GRITTER, supra note 97, at 23.
118. Of course, not every woman will wish to receive counseling. A recent book on
adoption policy and practice discusses this point:
It would be presumptuous to think that social workers can help every parent to reach an
appropriate decision concerning their child. In the first place, some parents will not need
a social worker to help them make up their minds. They will do so, one way or another,
and stick to it. Others may explore offers of counseling and other services but feel they
are perfectly able to cope alone.
TRISELIOTIS ET AL., supra note 81, at 97.
119. See infra Part V.
120. See CWLA STANDARDS, supra note 9, at 131.
121. TRISELIOTIS ET AL., supra note 81, at 113.
122. Id. at 100.
123. Id.
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counseling will also help mothers resolve issues that arise with the fathers and
family members.
Information should be provided to mothers both orally and in writing. As
social worker Patricia Roles puts it in her guide for counselors, published by
the CWLA, "[0]nly with all the facts can anyone make a well-thought-out,
informed decision. Supplying written information is most useful because it
allows the client to read and digest the material when she feels ready.,,124
Information provided orally may be insufficient because the recipient may be
"in a state of shock or denial and unable to retain all the information.,,125
Initially, information should be available to pregnant women and new
mothers about what alternatives are available for the care of their children,
how to determine the support needed to rear their children, and how to access
the resources they will need. 126 The CWLA advises agencies to "support birth
parents and extended family members, whenever possible, in providing for
their children's safety and protection.,,127 A similar view is expressed by
adoption counselor and author James L. Gritter, who advises that if possible,
"[t]he obvious first effort is to find ways to relieve these circumstances,,128 that
have led the mother to consider adoption.
Secondly, information should be provided about adoption, which as Gritter
points out, "at its best is often a bittersweet mixture of triumph and
sadness. . .. Women who are thinking about adoption should not base their
ideas on propaganda; they deserve a reasonable description of its costs and
benefits.,,129 Ifmothers choose adoption, they should have information about
and understand options within adoption and the consequences of different
options, incl,uding possible degrees of openness. 130 Openness before birth may
mean that the pregnant woman and adoptive parents meet, spend time together,
and in some1cases, all be present at the birth. Openness after the adoption may
range from the adoptive parents occasionally providing photographs of and
reports about the child to a schedule of regular visits. 131 There is especially
intense debate over the advisability of having prospective adoptive parents
present at birth. The support and advocacy group Concerned United
Birthparents (CUB)132 advises women against having the prospective adoptive

124. 2APATRICIARoLEs, SAYING GoODBYE TO A BABY 15 (1989).
125. 2A id.
126. See CWLA STANDARDS, supra note 9, at 28.
127. Id. at 13.
128. GRITTER, supra note 97, at 213.
129. Id. at 88.
130. See id.
13l. The CWLA describes open adoption as an "arrangement that recognizes the child's
connection to both the birth family and the adoptive family by supporting interaction among
the birth parents, adoptive parents, and the child through telephone calls, correspondence, or
personal contact, depending upon the particular situation." CWLA STANDARDS, supra note 9,
at 142.
132. CUB describes itself as a group that includes
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parents in the delivery room because "they make it next to impossible to
change your mind."133 Even those more amenable to the idea counsel caution
because it "may make birthmothers feel obligated to relinquish the child even
if they want to change their mind. They may not want to let the couple down.
It is important therefore to be clear with all parties involved that the decision
may be changed after the birth.,,134
In addition to information about options within adoption, mothers should
receive accurate and clear information about legal steps and consequences
involved, and they should receive copies of all papers they sign. 135 For
example, they should be informed about whether they may give binding
consent before the birth, after the birth, or only after the passage of a certain
number of hours or days after the birth. They should be informed about
whether they have any right to revoke their consent and, if so, when and how
to do so and whether revocation means automatic return of the child or a
judicial best-interests determination. If any agreements are contemplated
between the mother and 'the prospective adoptive parents, such as agreements
concerning providing information about the child's development, they should
be informed about whether and under what circumstances the agreements are
enforceable.
Mothers should also have information about the ways that placing a child
for adoption may affect them in the short and long term. The CWLA
standards advise that "[i]n all instances, birth parents and other family
members should receive counseling to help them understand the grief and
loss" that they may experience.136 While studies are limited, those that have
been conducted "suggest that relinquishment is a very stressful event and that
many mothers are haunted by it for years later.,,137 The studies constitute "a
growing body of recent research data which has supported the claims of birth
parents that relinquishing a child is indeed a profound loss experience, and that

birthparents, adoptees, adoptive parents, other adoption affected people and professionals.
CUB's purposes are providing mutual support for coping with the ongoing challenges of
adoption, working for adoption reform in law and social policy, preventing unnecessary
family separations, assisting adoption separated relatives in searching for family members,
and educating the public about adoption issues and realities.
Concerned United Birthparents, What is CUB?, at http://www.cubirthparents.orglpage9.htm
(last visited May 10, 2005).
133. HEATHER LOWE, WHAT You SHOUWKNow IF YOU'RE CONSIDERING ADOPTION FOR
YOUR BABY § 10, available at http://www.cubirthparents.orglbooklet.pdf(lastvisitedMay 10,
2005).
134. 2AROLES, supra note 124, at 18.
135. See GRITTER, supra note 97, at 217; 2A ROLES, supra note 124, at 18.
136. CWLA STANDARDS, supra note 9, at 28.
137. TRiSEUOTIS ET AL., supra note 81 at 99; see also Diana S. Edwards, American
Adoption and the Experiences a/Relinquishing Mothers, PRACTICING ANTHROPOLOGY, Winter
1999, at 18 (discussing her research documenting birth mothers' experiences).
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this loss even can have long-term deleterious results.,,138 Researchers have
found among "birth mothers unresolved anger, pathological mourning, guilt,
searching in waking life or in dreams and memories, [and] being stirred by
anniversaries such as the child's birthday. Continuing distress, cycles of
blame, guilt and personal anguish arising from the parting decision are some
ofthe lingering feelings.,,139 Similarly, long-term effects have been reported
both by counselors who have interviewed and worked with birth mothers and
by birth mothers who have written about their experiences. For example,
adoption counselor and author James L. Gritter reports that "few . . .
birthparents are prepared for the grief they encounter. Most find it far more
forceful and complex than they anticipated. They are amazed at the intensity
of its grip and dismayed at its staying power.,,140 In a similar vein, CUB
advises mothers, "Placing your child for adoption profoundly and irreversibly
changes your life. . .. After the first years, the grief is not static; while never
fully disappearing, it does ebb and flOW.,,141
Offering a more positive view of the effects on birth mothers, some U.S.
research, which is primarily focused on teen women, "has suggested
educational and economic benefits for single women when they choose
adoption instead of parenting and important benefits for their children when
they are placed with adoptive families.,,142 In addition, the possible negative

138. ROBIN C. WINKLER ET AL., CLINICAL PRACTICE IN ADOPTION 48 (1988) (citing K.D.
INGLIS, LIVING MISTAKES: MOTHERS WHO CONSENTED TO ADOPTION (1984); R. WINKLER &
M. VAN KEpPEL, RELINQUISHING MOTHERS IN ADOPTION: THEIR LONG-TERM ADJUSTMENT
(1984); John T. Condon, Psychological Disability in Women Who Relinquish a Baby for
Adoption, 144 MED. J. AUSTL. 177 (1986); Eva Y. Deykin et aI., The Post-Adoption Experience
of Surrendering Parents, AM. J. ORTHOPSYClllATRY, Apr. 1984, at 271-280; E. Reynearson,
Relinquishment and Its Maternal Complications: A Preliminary Study, 139 AM. J. PSYClllATRY
338 (1982); A. Fonda, Birth Mothers Who Search: An Exploratory Study (1984)(unpublished
Ph.D dissertation, California School of Professional Psychology, Berkeley, CaL); J.
McHutchison, Relinquishing a Child: The Circumstances and Effect of Loss (1986)
(unpublished BSS thesis, University of New South Wales, Australia)); see also id. at 53
(discussing the immediate post-relinquishment period).
139. TRISELIOTIS ET AL., supra note 81, at 45 (citing P. BOUCHIER ET AL., PARTING WITH
A CHILD FOR ADOPTION (1991); D. HOWE ET AL., HALF AMILLION WOMEN (1992); WINKLER
& VAN KEpPEL, supra note 138; R. Pannor et aI., Open Adoption as Standard Practice, 63
CHILD WELFARE 245 (1984); s. Wells, What Do Birth Mothers Want?, 17 ADOPTION &
FOSTERING 22, 22-32 (1993)).
140. GRITTER, supra note 97, at 109; see, e.g. , JAYNE E. SCHOOLER & BETSIE L. NORRIS,
JOURNEYS AFTER ADOPTION: UNDERSTANDING LIFELONG ISSUES 84 (2002) ("She may not feel
her grief initially, but will find it surfacing later in her life at major milestones. 'The grieving
never stopped. It only went below my threshold of awareness for periods of time,' said Carol
Schaefer, a birthmother and author ....").
141. LOWE, supra note 133, § 12.
142. 3 FREUNDLICH, supra note 3, at 86 (citing F. FURSTENBERG, JR. ET AL., ADOLESCENT
MOTHERS IN LATER LIFE (1987); Greg 1. Duncan & Saul D. Hoffman, Teenage Welfare Receipt
and Subsequent Dependence Among BlackAdolescent Mothers, 22 F AM. PLANNING PERSP. 16
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effects on birth mothers may be lessened when they have had sufficient
resources and support to make an informed and deliberate choice, as discussed
throughout this Part about best practices. Based on many years of work in
adoption, Gritter observes that "the degree of control birthparents have over
the situation powerfully affects their long-term satisfaction with the
arrangement.,,143 Practitioner and researcher John Triseliotis adds, "It is now
recognized that many of the issues raised by birth mothers with researchers
might have been resolved if they had had the support of trained and
experienced professionals who were not directly involved with the adoption
decision."I44 Social worker Patricia Roles agrees that when "a birthparent can
take responsibility for her decision and feel that she has a choice," she can
"incorporate the experience into her adult life without being hindered by
regret, blame or anger.,,145
Mothers also should have information concerning the effects of adoption
on children. As Gritter writes, "advantages [of adoption for the child] are
accompanied by significant losses. . .. A pregnant woman considering
adoption for her child needs to consider the ratio of losses and gains posed by
the adoption choice.,,146 For the adopted person as well as for the birth and
adoptive parents, adoption is now thought to be "a lifelong process.,,147
Psychologist and researcher David M. Brodzinsky concludes that while "most
adopted children appear to cope quite well with the challenges, conflicts, and
demands of adoptive family life," a review of the limited research available
suggests that "adopted children are at an increased risk for psychological and
academic problems in comparison to their non-adopted counterparts.,,148
Adopted children are thought to face some unique developmental challenges.

(1990); Frank L. Mott & William Marsiglio, Early Childbearing and Completion of High
School, 17 F AM. PLANNING PERSP. 234 (1985». Freundlich also describes research that "finds
mixed outcomes [after four years] for unmarried teen women who choose parenting or
adoption." 3 id. at 87 (citing S. McLaughlin et aI., Do Adolescents Who Relinquish Their
Children Fare Better or Worse Than Those Who Raise Them?, 20 FAM. PLANNING PERSP. 25
(1988); P.B. Namerow et aI., The Determinants of Young Women's Pregnancy-Resolution
Choices,3 J. REs. ON ADOLESCENCE 193 (1993».
143. GRITTER, supra note 97, at 89; see also id. at 196 (discussing the birth mother's
perspective of owning her decision).
144. TRISELIOTIS ET AL., supra note 81, at 99; see also WINKLER ET AL., supra note 138,
at 50-51 ("Damaged self-esteem and a strong sense of worthlessness (complicated by shame
and guilt) resulted from the way in which their needs and experiences were ignored by members
of the adoption community.").
145. 2A ROLES, supra note 124, at 19.
146. GRITTER, supra note 97, at 87.
147. WINKLER ET AL., supra note 138, at ix; see also Naomi Cahn, Perfect Substitutes or
the Real Thing?, 52 DUKE L.J. 1077, 1148-54 (2003) (discussing "adoptive families and
assimilation").
148. David M. Brodzinsky, A Stress and Coping Model ofAdoption Adjustment, in THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF ADOPTION 3,23 (David M. Brodzinsky & Marshall D. Schechter eds., 1990).
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"[U]nlike children growing up with their birth parents," Triseliotis observes,
"those adopted have to accomplish or be aided to accomplish a number of
additional psychological tasks, which most of them do successfully.,,149 Those
tasks include attaching to new parents, understanding the meaning of adoption,
acknowledging the differences involved in having two sets of parents, and
"dealing with the sense of loss of the original parents and the element of
rejection that it conveys.,,150 Adoptees in traditional closed adoptions wonder
about their birth parents and why they were placed for adoption. 151 According
to psychologist Robin C. Winkler, their "fantasies vary on a continuum; they
may be occasional and have little significance for behavior, or they may be
constant preoccupations and be of great significance to many areas of
functioning.,,152 It is widely believed, Triseliotis writes, that adoptees can best
resolve their identity issues by acknowledging rather than denying their
"biological roots and heritage, including race and ethnicity.,,153
Counseling services for mothers, whenever possible, should include
communication and consultation with the fathers and with family members.
When there is disagreement among family members, the CWLA recommends
that "skillful counseling should be provided to help all parties reach agreement
whenever possible.,,154
Studies of unmarried pregnant women's
decisionmaking have reported that the women's parents are important
influences. 155 In Triseliotis' s view of desirable practices, "[s]ocial workers can
use mediation and other skills to help defuse conflict and promote a better
family relationship and/or create a generally more supportive environment for

149. TRiSEUOTIS ET AL., supra note 81, at 35. Another book for practitioners explains,
"While all children follow the same path of development, adopted children are exposed to a
unique set of tasks which tend to complicate their development." WINKLER ET AL., supra note
138, at 85.
150. TRiSEUOTIS ET AL., supra note 81, at 35.
151. WINKLERET AL., supra note 138, at II.
152. Id. For literature on adoptees' development and adjustment, see, for example,
ALEXINA McWINNIE, ADOPTED CHIWREN AND How THEy GROW UP (1967); RONALD J.
NYDAM, ADoPTEES COME OF AGE (1999); and EUNOR B. ROSENBERG, THE ADOPTION LIFE
CYCLE: THE CHILDREN AND THEIR FAMIUES THROUGH THE YEARS (1992).
153. TRiSEUOTIS ET AL., supra note 81, at 14; see also H. DAVID KIRK., SHARED FATE: A
THEORY OF ADOPTION AND MENTAL HEALTH (1964) (analyzing a range of acceptance issues
in the adoptive relationship).
154. CWLA STANDARDS, supra note 9, at 29.
155. Freundlich reports on research in the 1980s and early 1990s involving pregnant teen
women and showing that their mothers most influenced the decision. 3 FREUNDUCH, supra
note 3, at 78. She describes research published in 1996 involving pregnant women ages
fourteen through thirty-six that also identified the involvement oftheir parents as a "key factor,"
but unlike the earlier studies, in the direction of choosing parenting rather than adoption. 3 id.
at 80.
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the mother and the expected baby, without taking the decision away from the
birth parent.,,156
In addition to providing mothers with the kinds of information discussed
above, counselors should understand "the ambivalence and denial that birth
parents often experience.,,157 Pertman suggests that
[0]ne of the most productive functions adoption professionals can serve is to
catch the warning signs of a change of mind as early as possible. Doing so
benefits everyone concerned-the pregnant women who endure less angst by
making their determinations sooner rather than later, and the adoptive parents
who are spared the heartbreak of anticipating children who will never
arrive. ISS

For mothers, Gritter observes, "Seldom is adoption selected as a true
preference-it almost always involves a pronounced element of necessity.
The idea of adoption ... only emerges as a possible outcome when something
is seriously askew.,,159 Statistics support the observation that adoption is not
a "preferred" option for unmarried pregnant women. Between 1989 and 1995,
the percentage of unmarried white women placing children for adoption was
approximately 1.7%, and the percentage for African-American women was
even smaller. 160 Among women today who believe they have settled on
adoption before the birth, it is estimated that "at least half ultimately discover
that they can't go through with it once they actually see their babies as living,
breathing realities.,,161

B. Structure ofAdoption Services
Even when counseling is available and includes the fathers and family
members, there is an inherent troubling potential for imposition of biases and
conflicts of interest. According to the National Association of Social Workers
Code of Ethics, the "best-known ethics code to which social workers in the
United States'subscribe,,,162 social workers have a fundamental responsibility
to facilitate their clients self-determination,163 expand choice and opportunity

156. TRISEUOTIS ET AL., supra note 81, at 96.
157. CWLASTANDARDS, supra note 9, at 28-29; see also GRITTER, supra note 97, at 91107 (discussing the ambivalence of birth parents).
158. PERTMAN, supra note 66, at 109.
159. GRITTER, supra note 97, at 94.

160. See Anjani Chandra et aI., Adoption, Adoption Seeking, and Relinquishment for
Adoption in the United States, (Nat'l Center for Adoption Statistics, ADVANCE DATA Report
No. 306, 1999).
161. PERTMAN, supra note 66, at 109.
162. FREDERIC G. REAMER, SOCIAL WORK. V ALVES AND ETHICS 44 (1995).
163. See NAT'LAss'N OF SOC. WORKERS, CODE OF ETHICS § 1.02 (1999).
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for all people,l64 and, when necessary, "tak~ reasonable steps to ensure" that
their employers' practices are consistent with the code of ethics. 165
Complicating the adoption counselor's task is the fact that in a crisis, the
counselor has the potential to exercise "immense power.,,166 "There are times,
especially when frustration runs high, when the decisionmaker would love to
have some powerful, decisive person come along and take the decision out of
her hands.,,167
As Roles points out in her guide for counselors, if a "young woman must
make her own decision because she has to live with it for the rest of her life,"
then the ideal counselor is "a neutral, unbiased [one] who has no vested
interest in the outcomes of her decision."168 She continues, "If a client feels
pressured toward any particular choices, a power struggle will result where the
client will be forced to defend her position, rather than consider all the
options.,,169 Gritter observes, "To the worker who is trying to arrange
adoption, [the woman's] ambivalence is an exasperating, frustrating
impediment to overcome. To the worker striving to help the expectant mother
settle on the best decision, it is the central issue, a normal and expected aspect
of the work to be done.,,17o
Counselors, . agency officials, and intermediaries of course may have
strong biases based on their philosophical, religious, or social views. They
may favor family preservation, regardless of the circumstances, or they may
believe adoption is invariably the best option when a mother is unmarried or
has limited economic and social support. The views of the volunteers and
professionals in the child welfare community have varied over time. In the
late nineteenth and early twentieth century, the expectation of child welfare
workers was that unmarried pregnant women would keep their children.
According to his.torian Barbara Melosh, child welfare workers in the 1920s
and 1930s were reluctant advocates of adoption at a time when increasing
numbers of couples sought to adopt, but workers later endorsed adoption as a
solution for a child born out of wedlock. l7l After World War II, "adoption
became social policy," and "[r]eversing their former reluctance to separate
stngle mothers and their children, social workers came to consider adoption
the best solution for unwed mothers and their children.,,172 Their "zeal for
relinquishment was driven partly by the conviction that women pregnant out
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

Id. § 6.04(b).
Id. § 3.09(d).

TRiSELIOTIS ET AL., supra note 81, at 97.
GRITTER, supra note 97, at 103.
2A ROLES, supra note 124, at 14.
2A id.
GRITTER, supra note 97, at 103-04.
See MELOSH, supra note 75, at 17-20; see also Naomi Cahn, Birthing Relationships,
17 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 163, 179-84 (2002) (discussing the change in attitude towards adoption
that began in the 1920s).
172. . MELOSH, supra note 75, at 105-06.

534

TENNESSEE LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 72:509

of wedlock were by definition unfit mothers" whose pregnancies were
evidence of neuroses. 173 Although professional ethics, then as now, dictated
that social workers support pregnant women in reaching their own decisions,
social workers "believed strongly that adoption was the best decision for most,
and this commitment inevitably colored their relationships with women
considering relinquishment." 174
Another factor that can affect the neutrality of counseling is the conflict
that arises from providing services to birth parents and adoptive parents
simultaneously. It is natural for service providers to attend to the clients who
are paying for the services-the prospective adoptive parents, 175 and it is easier
for many providers to sympathize with the adoptive parents, who are more
established in life and have struggled to conceive a child. CUB advises
pregnant women and new mothers not to expect that an agency or a pregnancy
counselor "will have only your best interest in mind. They do not, and they
cannot. Adoption agencies, like it or not, have to make money to operate. The
paying client is the adoptive parent, so services are usually geared toward
them.,,176 Gritter observes that professionals involved in adoption "[m]ost of
the time . . . find it easier to identify with adoptive parents than with
birthparents, who are typically less established.,,177 Roles's guide for
counselors concludes that an "agency with a vested interest in a client's
decision . . . opens itself to potential abuse and neglect of birthparents'
rights.,,178 Triseliotis goes as far as to conclude that a social worker involved
in arranging an adoption should not simultaneously work with a birth parent
choosing between different altematives. 179 "In other words, the birth parents
need to have their own separate social worker. This can help to preserve
objectivity, impartiality and continued support where needed.,,180

173. Id. at 11 O.
174. Id. at 123.
175. See supra Part III.
176. LOWE, supra note 133, § 6.
177. GRITTER, supra note 97, at 210.
178. 2A ROLEs, supra note 124, at 13.
179. TRISELIOTIS ET AL., supra note 81, at 95.
180. Id. The availability ofpeer support is also recommended for birth parents considering
placing their children for adoption. Triseliotis notes, for example, that "[iln some instances it
will be helpful for the parent to meet others who have faced the same dilemma and to discuss
the advantages and disadvantages of the various outcomes." Id. at 97. Roles agrees that
referring birth parents "to support networks or groups for birthparents can be helpful."
2A ROLES, supra note 124, at 20; see also WINKLERET AL., supra note 138, at 51 (suggesting
that birth parents meet with others who can "relate their personal experiences"); LoWE, supra
note 133, § 7 (suggesting that birth mothers talk to women who have been through the
relinquishment process).
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C. Legal Representation
It is in independent adoptions, the most common type of domestic infant
adoption,181 that questions about legal representation most frequently arise. Is
it permissible for one lawyer to represent both the adoptive and birth parents?
Should the parties be required to have separate representation in all cases or
only in cases in which birth parents are minors or under some other disability?
In an informal opinion in 1987, the American Bar Association Standing
Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility concluded that a lawyer
may not ethically represent both parties. 182 Dual representation is expressly
permitted, however, in at least two states, Kansas l83 and Califomia. 184 It is
expressly prohibited by statutes in a number of states, including Kentucky,
Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, New York, and Wisconsin,185 and
Florida prohibits intermediaries from providing legal representation or advice
to birth parents. 186 Louisiana requires separate representation in all private
adoptions,187 and a small number of states, including Kansas, Maryland,
Montana, and Vermont, require separate representation for minor parents. 188

181. See supra Part III.
182. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof! Responsibility, Informal Op. 1523 (1987)
[hereinafter ABA Informal Op.).
183. In re Adoption of Baby Girl T., 21 P.3d 581, 589 (Kan. Ct. App. 2001) (noting that
dual representation is permitted if certain conditions are met).
184. CAL. FAM. CODE. § 8800(c)-(d) (West 2004). In California an attorney must have
written consent of the parties before engaging in dual representation, but the attorney may not
engage in dual representation "whenever a birth parent displays the slightest reason for the
attorney to believe any controversy might arise." CAL. FAM. CODE. § 8800(c). Ifa conflict
arises after an attorney begins dual representation, the attorney must withdraw. CAL. FAM.
CODE. § 8800(c). In addition, birth parents have the right to an independent attorney to whom
prospective adoptive parents may be required to pay reasonable attorney's fees up to $500
unless a higher fee is agreed to by the parties. CAL. FAM. CODE. § 8800(d).
185. Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 199.492 (Michie 1998); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 9106(a) (West 1964); MD. CODEANN.,FAM. LAW§ 5-323(e) (1999); MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN.
§ 722.956(c)(ix) (West 2002); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 259.47 (West 2003); N.Y. SOC. SERV.LAW
§ 374(6) (McKinney 2003); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.837(8) (West 2003).
186. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 63.032, 63.085 (West 1997).
187. LA. CH. CODE ANN. art. 1121 (West 2004).
188. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2115 (1994); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-323(a)(l)
(appointment of counsel also required for parent rendered by disability incapable of consenting
and effectively participating in proceedings); MONT. CODE ANN. § 42-2-405(2) (2003); YT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 15A, § 2-405(c) (2002). Alabama and Arkansas require appointment of a
guardian ad litem for a minor birth parent. ALA. CODE § 26-IOA-8 (Supp. 2004); ARK. CODE
ANN. § 9-9-220 (Michie 2002). Maine requires the court to appoint an attorney for an indigent
birth parent who is a minor, unless the birth parent refuses or "the court determines that
representation is unnecessary." ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 9-106(b). New Hampshire
requires representation if a birth parent is incompetent, mentally ill, or retarded. N.H. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 170-B:5(II) (2002).
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In practice, when separate representation is not required, birth parents
generally are unrepresented. 189 There are potential risks for mothers without
representation, but as the debates about representation reveal, there also are
risks when they are represented by either the adoptive parents' lawyer or
separate counsel paid for by the adoptive parents. 190
Dual representation proponents argue that a conflict of interest between
the parties is "often more hypothetical than real" because both parties "are
usually strongly in favor of the adoption.,,191 Writing about how dual
representation is permitted under some circumstances in California, lawyer Jed
Somit also contends that separate representation increases costs and introduces
the specter of runaway fees if the adoptive parents are liable for the birth
parents' attorney's fees without limit. 192 Separate representation "makes or at
least stigmatizes as adversarial what is ideally a cooperative process.,,193 He
offers the disheartening additional argument that, despite its dangers, dual
representation may be preferable to separate representation because the birth
parents' attorney is usually paid less and may provide inferior
representation. 194 In any event, it is claimed that "experienced adoption
attorneys avoid dual representation" in the "[m]any situations" in which it is
not suitable. 195 If dual representation has been undertaken and a conflict
arises, the lawyer should withdraw and the parties can then obtain separate
counsel,196 or, as expressly permitted in some state court decisions, the lawyer
may terminate the dual representation and choose which party to continue
representing. 197
Opponents of dual representation, including the ABA, maintain there are
"inherent conflicts" that "cannot be reconciled" between the biological
parents' right to withhold or revoke consent and the prospective adoptive

189. "In the vast majority of adoptions where the child is adopted on the basis of a consent
to adoption, the petitioners are represented by a lawyer but the consenting parties are not."
GITLIN, supra note 73, at 22.
190. See, e.g., Pamela K. Strom AmIung, Comment, Conflicts ofInterest in Independent
Adoptions: Pitfallsfor the Unwary, 59 U. CIN. L. REv. 169 (1990); Linda Jean Davie, Note,
Babes and Barristers: Legal Ethics and Lawyer-Facilitated Independent Adoptions, 12
HOFSTRA L. REv. 933 (1984). Adoptive parents may pay birth parents' legat fees except in a
number of states in which the specified expenses that adoptive parents may pay do not include
legal costs. Amlung, supra, at 184 & n.l09.
191. Jed Somit, Independent Adoptions in California; Dual Representation Allowed, in 2
ADOPTION LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 6, § 5.04(4)(c).
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. See id.
197. See, e.g., Arden v. State Bar of Cal., 341 P.2d 6, II (Cal. 1959); In re Adoption of
Baby Girl H., 739 P.2d 1,3 (Kan. Ct. App. 1987).
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parents' goal of securing consent and avoiding revocation. 198 In this view,
dual representation violates Rule 1.7(a) of the ABA Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, which prohibits representing a client "if the
representation of [that] client will be directly adverse to another client," unless
the lawyer reasonably believes it will not be and each client consents after
consultation. 199 Conflicts may arise over not only the ultimate issue of consent
but also issues of financial support, the timing of consents and placements,200
and if contemplated by the parties, the nature and extent of future contact. The
ability of parties to knowingly consent to dual representation is doubted, given
the emotional and stressful nature of their situations: "It is difficult to believe
[that they] can really grasp the essential point: that the same lawyer is
advising the biological mother and the couple who desperately want to obtain
her child.,,201 Also, consent cannot be obtained from two interested parties:
that is, the child being adopted and the state. 202 Finally, the Model Rules
indicate that costs for services performed by two lawyers should not exceed
the cost of the same services provided by one lawyer. "If the savings by
retaining a single attorney is obtained at the sacrifice of adequate, thorough
representation of each party's separate interest, it would seem a dubious
benefit. ,,203
Does any expression of doubt or ambivalence by a mother mean that the
attorney must cease dual representation? Will a mother's interests be
compromised if a conflict arises and dual representation ceases when a
revocation period is about to expire? If there has been dual representation,
will adoptive parents be vulnerable to a challenge to the adoption based on a
claim of undue influence or duress? If a conflict arises, is it permissible for
the attorney to continue to represent the adoptive parents who are paying for
the legal services, even though the dual representation has "removed the
communications of the parties to one another and to the attorney from the
privileged category,,?204 If it is not permissible for the attorney to continue to
represent one of the parties, will costs considerably increase in situations in
which dual representation has been undertaken and terminated?
Those who favor requiring separate representation, whether in all cases or
in a limited class of cases, emphasize the important nature of the adoption
proceeding, the typical imbalance of power between birth parents and adoptive
parents, the possibility of conflicts of interest, and the fact that many birth

ABA Informal Op., supra note 182.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (2002).
200. See Katherine G. Thompson & Douglas H. Reiniger, Private-Placement Adoptions
in New York; Separate Representation Required, in 2 ADOPTION LAW AND PRACTICE, supra
note 6, § 6.01(3)(a).
201. Id. § 6.01(3)(b).
198.
199.

202.
203.
204.

See id.
Id. § 6.01(7).
See Arden Y. State Bar of Cal., 341 P.2d 6, 11 (Cal. 1959).
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mothers change their minds after the birth. Lawyers Katherine G. Thompson
and Douglas H. Reiniger, for example, argue for separate representation
because most mothers are young, lack financial resources,20S and are in such
stressful, painful situations that their "capacity for rational decision-making at
this time is not completely reliable.,,206 Prospective adoptive parents, in
contrast, tend to be "somewhat older than most biological parents," are
"usually well above-average in income and education,,,207 and are thus more
financially able to retain an attorney.20S Even with separate representation,
there is a danger of the mother's attorney being too closely associated with the
prospective adoptive parents or their attorney if the mother's attorney has been
recommended by the adoptive parents' attorney or is paid by the adoptive
parents. The danger is described in a proposed model disclosure form:
There is a risk that since the money is coming from [Adopting Parents]
through [Adopting Parents' Attorney's] office, I will be more attentive to
their needs, and more cooperative with that law office, than I am to your
interests .... However, I am an experienced attorney, and I believe I can
represent the interests of my clients notwithstanding getting paid (or not
getting paid) by another. 209

Reflecting a similar concern is the advice that birth parents obtain an attorney
through referrals independent of the adoptive parents' attorney. "[T]he
attorney for the adoptive parents should have little or no control over what
lawyer represents the birth parentes). . .. If the adoptive parents' attorney does

205. See Thompson & Reiniger, supra note 200, § 6.01(2)(a)(iii).
206. Id. § 6.01(2)(a)(ii).
207. Id. § 6.01(2)(b)(i).
208. Id. § 6.01(2)(a)(ii).
209. Somit, supra note 191, § 5.04(3)(b). A similar concern was articulated by an Ohio
appellate court:
We are compelled to emphasize that while there is no evidence of any impropriety as
to the fee arrangement here, such may not always be the result. The better practice is that
the birth mother be solely responsible for her fees, or if the adoptive parents agree to the
payment ofthe birth mother's attorney fees, such payments must not be contingent upon
the outcome of placement or adoption.
In re Adoption ofInfant Girl Banda, 559 N.E.2d 1373, 1383 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988). Similarly,
in a case involving an analogous issue, a justice of the North Dakota Supreme Court noted in
a concurrence:
[nhe adoption agency is in the business, if you will, of obtaining babies for adoption ....
While an agency's advising or attempting to persuade a parent to consent to termination
of parental rights does not constitute duress ... , a mother contemplating termination of
her parental rights needs distance from the agency .... The means available to insure that
distance is an attorney ... not hired or paid by the adoption agency.
In re D.J.H., 401 N.W.2d 694, 704 (N.D. 1987) (Levine, J., concurring specially) (citations
omitted).
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participate in the selection process, he should give the birth parent at least
three names of experienced attorneys ... .'>210

D. Timing of Consents
There is nearly universal agreement that a woman should not consent to
adoption before the birth because she cannot be sure of what her feelings will
be after the child is born. 2I1 Reportedly, some one half of the women who
believe they have settled on adoption change their minds after the birth.212 The
Wyoming Supreme Court noted that "[e]xperience has evidenced a host of
cases in which a mother plans to give her unborn child to adoptive parents,
only to change her mind after going through child-birth and the resulting
mother-child attachment.,,213 The guide for counselors published by the
CWLA advises counselors to make sure birth parents understand that they are
the child's legal parents. "This means that they can see, hold, feed, or care for
their baby. The level of contact is up to them. Many young people feel
intimidated by those in authority and might not realize that they have these
choices."214
Pertman reports that "[b]irth mothers typically want to spend time with
their babies, and virtually all mental-health and social-work professionals
advise them to do so. Some just hold their children for a few minutes, while
others need days or weeks.,,215 Citing research showing "that people need to
face the searing issues in their lives in order to work through them with a
minimum of psychic damage," he suggests that "women who say good-bye
without first saying hello generally can't fully process their decisions and
therefore never come to terms with them.,,216 The birth parents' organization
CUB recommends that women either parent their children for a week or two
or consider a brief period of foster care.217 For mothers who are minors, a
foster care placement for mother and child together is a possibility.218
CUB contends that women who sign irrevocable consents in the hospital
shortly after birth are "rushed into signing without a chance to process all of
the information.,,219 CUB categorically advises women, "[N]ever sign papers

210. Thompson & Reiniger, supra note 200, § 6.01(4)(a).
211. See supra Part IV.A.
212. PERTMAN, supra note 66, at 109.
213. In re Adoption ofBGD, 713 P.2d 1191, 1193 (Wyo. 1986).
214. 2A ROLES, supra note 124, at 17.
215. PERTMAN, supra note 66, at 213.
216. Id.
217. See LOWE, supra note 133, § 10.
218. See, e.g., Ala. Dept. of Human Res., Foster Care for Teen Mom[s1 & Their Children,
at http://www.dhr.state.al.us/page.asp?pageid=470 (last visited May 5, 2005) (noting that by
providing care for a teenage mother and child, a foster family offers "a better environment in
which a teenage mom can begin her role as a parent").
219. LOWE, supra note 133, § 10.
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in the hospital. . .. Adoption is a serious matter, one that should be finalized
only in a courtroom or a legal environment, not a recovery bed. ,,220 This
advice is consistent with two studies in the United Kingdom concerning timing
of consents. The researchers in those studies concluded that "most mothers
saw six weeks after birth as a reasonable time" to be asked to give consent,
without opportunity to revoke. 221 Infants, of course, can be placed in the
custody of their prospective adoptive parents as soon as the parties feel
confident that the birth parents' are unlikely to change their minds. For
example, as Triseliotis notes, a number of agencies in Scotland place newborns
directly from the hospital even though the mother has six weeks to change her
mind, "provided the mother's decision about the future of her baby seem[s]
final. ,,222
While foster care before placement is disfavored compared with care by
the baby's mother,223 no research or historical experience suggests that a
period of a few days to a few weeks in foster care damages newborn babies
who then return to their birth families or move into secure "adoptive
placements. "Attachment behavior" usually begins to appear in infants
between six and nine months of age,224 according to the studies described in
John Bowlby's influential works on attachment and the grief children
experience when separated from adults to whom they are attached. Bowlby
notes that "when infants of twenty-six weeks and less are placed in a strange
place without [their] mother[s] they appear to accept strangers as mothersubstitutes without noticeable change in level of responsiveness and show little
or none of the protest and fretting typical of the slightly older child. ,,225 In
fact, "[t]hough uprooting and re-attachment carry many risks," recent studies
"suggest that the majority of children, especially when under ... the age of
about 9, seem to re-attach themselves to new families and do well.,,226 In
international adoptions of very young children, children typically join their
adoptive families weeks or months after birth.227 In domestic adoptions in the

220. Id.
221. TIuSEUOTIS ET AL., supra note 81, at 98. The mothers were interviewed shortly after
the birth of their children and again six months later. Id.
222. Id. at 62.
223. See id. at 63 ("Temporary placement in a foster home is not good from the child's
point of view, but this is sometimes inevitable to allow more time to the mother in which to
make up her mind or for the father to be located and to make up his mind.").
224. 1 JOHN BOWLBY, AITACHMENT AND Loss 200-201 (2d ed. 1982).
225. 3 id. at 434 (1980). "From the age of seven months onwards however a child in this
situation not only notices the change but, by protest and crying and also by persistent fretting
and rejection of the strange nurses, indicates his intense dislike of it.'" 3 id.
226. TIuSEUOTIS ET AL., supra note 81, at 36.
227. For example, the author of Fast Track Adoption explains to prospective adoptive
parents that a disadvantage of international adoption is the fact that "because complexities in
law and procedures can produce many delays, there are few opportunities to adopt a newborn."
BURNS, supra note 93, at 11.

2005]

541

CONSENTS TO ADOPTION

past, many children were kept in care for six to nine months before placement
in an effort to insure their physical and mental fitness. 228 As noted in Melosh' s
historical account,
[w]hile early placements appear to be typical now in the private adoption of
domestically born infants, periods in temporary foster care were common in
the past, both as a "safe-guard against hasty and ill-considered
relinquishments" and to study the child's development in order to make sure
that the child was fit to be adopted. 229

v.

STATE LAWS

The legal rules on the timing of consents are ultimately a compromise
between the interest in protecting biological mothersfrom making hasty
or ill-informed decisions at a time of great physical and emotional
stress, and the interest in expediting the adoption process for
newborns. 230
Joan Heifetz Hollinger
The variety of state laws presents a complex picture, but in sharp contrast
to the laws of many other countries,231 a majority of the laws provide for the
possibility of irrevocable consent within a week of the birth. In recent years,
the amendments to state adoption law timing requirements have generally
shortened periods of time before which mothers may give consent and during
which they may revoke. A majority of the laws do not require that consent be
given in court or before an official appointed by a court or another state
official. More than half of the states have some kind of statutory provision
regarding counseling. 232 A handful of states require separate representation for
birth parents or for birth parents who are minors.233 The following bulleted list
provides a summary of state laws governing mothers' consents. 234

228. MELOSH, supra note 75, at 29-31.
229. Id. Melosh describes one agency's practices in the 1930s which "did not accept
relinquishments until the babies had been determined 'fit' for adoption. . .. Therefore, the
agency never placed children under six months of age; usually, children who came into the
bureau's care as newborns were not placed in adoptive homes until they were nine months to
a year old." Id.; see also id. at 38 ("Until after World War II, child welfare professionals
counseled that adoptive placements should not take place until the children were at least six
months old, allowing time for close observation and scientific testing.").
230. Joan Heifetz Hollinger, Consent to Adoption, in 1 ADoPTION LAW AND PRACTICE,
supra note 6, § 2.1 1(1)(a).
231. See supra Part II.
232. For a history of consent laws, see Cahn, supra note 147, at 1118-26.
233. See supra Part IV.C.
234. In this bulleted list and throughout this Article, a consent is identified as revocable
rather than irrevocable only when a mother has an unqualified right to revoke, not a "right to

,
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In nine states, the mother may give irrevocable consent any time after
birth,235 and in a number of those states, consent may be given even before
birth if it is followed by a post-birth reaffirmation or ratification. 236
In three states, the mother may consent before birth. In Colorado she may
revoke within four days after the birth; in Alabama she may revoke within
five days; and in Washington she may revoke until the court approves the
consent after a hearing, which may not be held sooner than two days after
the birth.237
In twenty-one states, the mother's consent is irrevocable when given but
cannot be given for a specified period after birth: twelve hours in Kansas,
twenty-four hours in Utah, two days in four states, three days in ten states,
four days in Massachusetts, five days in Louisiana, seven days in
Michigan, and fifteen days in Rhode Island.238 In Wisconsin the

revoke" that merely triggers a best interests contest between the mother and the prospective
adoptive parents. See infra Part VI.C. (describing "best interests" provisions and contests).
The total number of states in this bulleted list exceeds fifty because it includes the District
of Columbia and because a small number of states have different rules for agency and
independent adoptions and therefore appear on the list more than once. The numbers of states
in different categories are excellent, useful approximations but are unlikely to be one hundred
percent accurate because of possible changes in state laws and because they are based on two
published summaries of state law, with examination of state statutes in instances in which the
summaries are either unclear or inconsistent.
235. These states are California (in agency adoptions), Hawaii (consent to adoption
irrevocable after placement), Idaho, Indiana, New York, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South
Carolina, and Wyoming. 1 ADOPTION LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 6, at app. I-A; Nat'l
Council for Adoption, supra note 6; see also HAw. REv. STAT. § 578-2 (2005) (party executing
consent not required to appear in court); IDAHO CODE § 16-1506(2) (Supp. 2004) (same as
Hawaii); In re Steve B.D., 723 P.2d 829, 835 (Idaho 1986) (holding that when consent is
executed and the child is delivered to prospective adoptive parents, revocation triggers only a
best interest inquiry).
236. HAw. REv. STAT. §§ 571-61, -63 (2005) (providing that parents may petition to
terminate their parental rights after the sixth month of pregnancy, but judgment may not be
entered until after birth and a written reaffirmation); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-15.1-01 to -03
(2004) (providing that when the adopters have been selected by the birth parent, consent may
be executed and filed before birth, with a hearing held no sooner than forty-eight hours after
birth at which the court may require the birth parent to be present or may determine validity of
consent without the birth parent present); People ex rei Anonymous v. Anonymous, 530
N.Y.S.2d613, 617 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988) (suggesting that pre-birth consent maybe reaffirmed
or ratified after birth); see infra notes 299-304 and accompanying text (discussing an Indiana
case in which the mother ratified her pre-birth consent after the birth).
237. COLO. REv. STAT. § 19-5-103.5 (2004); WASH. REv. CODE § 26.33.090 (2000);
1 ADoPTION LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 6, at app. I-A; Nat'l Council for Adoption, supra
note 6.
238. Florida (or when notified in writing of being fit to be released from the hospital,
whichever is earlier), Nebraska, New Mexico, Texas (agency adoptions), (two days); Arizona
(or pre-birth, with post-birth ratification), Illinois, Maine, Mississippi, Montana, Nevada, New
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irrevocable consent is given at a court hearing that is set within thirty days
of a request for the hearing, but not before the birth.239
In seven states, the consent may be given immediately after birth but is
revocable without qualification for a specified period: seven days in
North Carolina; ten days in Arkansas and Georgia; fourteen days in
Delaware; thirty days in Maryland; and in Alaska, until the court in which
the adoption petition has been filed issues an order approving a
guardian. 240
In thirteen states, consent may not be given for a specified period after
birth, and once it is given it may be revoked without qualification for a
period of time. The revocation periods are measured in fixed increments
in most of the states but in others are pegged to the happening of events,
such as court approvals of consents. For those states in which the
minimum period of combined time can be calculated, the number of days
before which consent may become irrevocable ranges from seven to
approximately thirty-five days.241 Under the federal Indian Child Welfare
Act, consent given within ten days of birth of an Indian child is invalid,
and a valid consent may be withdrawn "at any time" prior to the entry of
a final decree of adoption. 242
Ten state statutes require, either in some or in all types of adoptions, the

Hampshire, New Jersey, Ohio, West Virginia, (three days). I ADOPTION LAW AND PRACTICE,
supra note 6, at app. I-A; Nat'l Council for Adoption, supra note 6; see infra notes 262-65,
407-08 and accompanying text (describing current Texas and Florida law); see also In re
Adoption of Kreuger, 448 P.2d 82, 86 (Ariz. 1968) (providing that voidable pre-birth consent
"may be ratified by a subsequent act which sufficiently manifests a present intention to
consent").
239. WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 48.41, .837 (2003).
240. I ADOPTION LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 6, at app. I-A; Nat'l Council for
Adoption, supra note 6; see infra note 255 and accompanying text (providing more information
on current North Carolina law).
241. Iowa (seven days); Texas (in independent adoptions, twelve days, unless document
that specifies the consent is irrevocable for a specified period up to sixty days); District of
Columbia (thirteen days); Tennessee (fourteen days); Minnesota (approximately seventeen
days, including a revocation period of ten working days); Vermont (twenty-two and a half
days); Kentucky (twenty-three days); Virginia (twenty-five days); Pennsylvania (thirty-three
days); California (in independent adoptions, the mother may not consent until discharged from
the hospital or if her stay in the hospital is longer than five days, until she obtains from a
physician a statement of competence to consent, plus a thirty-day revocation period, unless it
is waived); Missouri (mother may not consent for two days, with consent revocable until
reviewed and accepted by a judge); Connecticut (two days must pass before mother may
consent, which remains revocable until approved by a court); South Dakota (mother may not
consent for five days, revocable until final decree). I ADOPTION LAW AND PRACTICE, supra
note 6, at app. I-A; Nat'l Council for Adoption, supra note 6; see infra notes 258-61,262-65,
271-73 and accompanying text (describing the current laws in Tennessee, Texas, and
Pennsylvania).
242. 25 U.S.C. § 1913(a)-(b) (2001).
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birth mother's consent to be taken in the presence of a judge, juvenile
court referee, or a court's authorized agent. 243 The federal Indian Child
Welfare Act requires execution of consent in writing before a judge. 244
Ten states require counseling for birth parents in some orin all adoptions.
Some of those states specify requisite amounts of counseling and some specify
the timing of the counseling. 245 Twenty states have statutory requirements that
birth parents in some or all types of adoptions be made aware of the fact that
counseling is available, with two states specifying counseling by a licensed
adoption agency. Only a handful of these states specify how much counseling
should be offered or mandate the counselor's qualifications or affiliations. 246

243. Alabama (pre-birth consent, probate judge); Idaho (district judge, magistrate of a
district court, or equivalent judicial officer); Maine (probate judge); Michigan (judge or juvenile
court referee); New Mexico (judge, unless parent is represented by independent counsel); North
Dakota (court); Oklahoma (judge); Vermont (probate judge or court's authorized agent);
Virginia (independent adoption, court); Wisconsin (court). 1 ADoPTION LAW AND PRACTICE,
supra note 6, at app. I-A; Nat'l Council for Adoption, supra note 6; see, e.g., IDAHO CODE
§ 16-2005 (Michie Supp. 2004); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 35A-5-23 (Michie,1964).
In Illinois, the mother must execute her consent before one ofa list of persons, including a
representative of a licensed agency. These options include:
the presiding judge of the court in which the petition for adoption has been, or is to be filed
or before any other judge or hearing officer designated or subsequently approved by the
court, or the circuit clerk if so authorized by the presiding judge or, except as otherwise
provided in this Act, before a representative of the Department of Children and Family
Services or a licensed child welfare agency, or before social service personnel under the
jurisdiction of a court of competent jurisdiction, or before social service personnel ofthe
Cook County Department of Supportive Services designated by the presiding judge.
750 ILL. CaMP. STAT. 50/10 (West Supp. 2004).
244. 25 U.S.C. § 1913(a).
245. Connecticut (counseling within seventy-two hours of birth or as soon as medically
possible by a person with a masters or doctoral degree from an accredited college or university);
District of Columbia (for agency adoptions, counseling by a professional social worker
regarding alternative services available, in addition to psychological and emotional counseling);
Louisiana (two sessions with a licensed counselor before consenting); Massachusetts (for
agency adoptions, education and counseling by a licensed clinician adequate to enable an
informed decision); Montana (three hours prior to consenting); Nebraska (minimum of four
hours of "education and support" services); Nevada (meeting with a licensed social worker
specializing in adoption prior to reaching decision); New Mexico (if eighteen years of age or
older, a minimum of one session not in the presence of her parents; if seventeen or younger, two
sessions; court may waive); Ohio (minimum one session completed at least seventy-two hours
before consenting); South Dakota; and Texas (does not require counseling per se but requires
that agencies must meet with birth parents two times before placement or document why this
is not possible). Nat'l Council for Adoption, supra note 6; see D.C. CODE ANN. § 4-1406(b)
(2001); infra notes 459-61 and accompanying text (providing more information on California's
law).
246. California (in independent adoptions, a minimum of three sessions by a counselor
with no contractual relationship with the adoptive parents or their attorney or any other
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States that have sharply limited consent or revocation periods in recent
years include Colorado, Louisiana, North Carolina, and South Carolina. 247 In
2003 Colorado established an expedited procedure for relinquishing parental
rights of children younger than one year of age. 248 Before the new law, when
a petition for relinquishment of parental rights was filed, the court scheduled
a hearing at which the parent appeared and the court determined whether the
parent had been counseled as well as whether "[t]he parent's decision to
relinquish is knowing and voluntary.,,249 Under the new law, the parent may
sign an affidavit before the child's birth.250 The affidavit, with the petition to
adopt, may be filed four days after the birth and once filed is irrevocable. 251

individual or organization perfonning a service for them for a fee); Colorado (mother advised
of "opportunity to seek independent counseling"); Florida; Iowa (counseling by a person
qualified under Department of Human Services rules, with a requirement of a minimum number
of hours of training); Maine (counselor certified by a licensed agency or the state's Department
of Human Resources); Michigan; Maryland; Minnesota (up to thirty-five hours, available from
conception until six months after birth); Missouri; New Hampshire; New Jersey (counseling by
a licensed adoption agency); New York (counseling by a licensed adoption agency);
Pennsylvania (court inquires about whether counseling has been received and, if not, whether
counseling is needed; court also has a referral list and funding available ifbirth parent cannot
afford counseling); Tennessee; Utah; Vennont; Virginia; Washington (mother advised that
financial assistance may be available through state and local governmental agencies); West
Virginia; and Wyoming. Nat'l Council for Adoption, supra note 6; see also COLO. REv. STAT.
§ 19-5-103.5(I)(b)(l) (2004); IOWA CODE § 600A.4(2)(d) (Supp. 2004); ME. REv. STAT. ANN.
tit. 18-A, § 9-202(b)(I) (1964); WASH. REv. CODE § 26. 133. 160(4)(h)(I) (2000).
New Mexico, which requires one or two counseling sessions, see supra note 245, also
requires that the counseling be by "a certified counselor ofthe person's choice," and specifies
that "[c]ounseling may be provided by a counselor, the department or an agency," defining a
"counselor" as "a person certified by the department to conduct adoption counseling in
independent adoptions." N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 32A-5-3(J), 32A-5-21(A)(5), 32A-5-22(G)
(Michie 2004).
247. In 1986 the Idaho Supreme Court also sharply limited birth mothers' opportunities
to have a court set aside their consents when it substituted a best interests standard for an
estoppel rule. See In re Steve B.D., 723 P.2d 829,835 (Idaho 1986). Under the estoppel rule,
a mother had been permitted to revoke her consent during the pendency of the adoption
proceeding if not estopped from doing so. Id. at 832. To detennine whether she was estopped,
the courts had considered a list of factors:
"the circumstances under which the consent was given; the length of time elapsing, and
the conduct of the parties, between the giving of consent and the attempted withdrawal;
whether or not the withdrawal was made before or after the institution of adoption
proceedings; the nature of the natural parent's conduct with respectto the child both before
and after consenting to its adoption; and the 'vested rights' of the proposed adoptive
parents with respect to the child."
Id. (quoting In re Anderson, 589 P.2d 957, 963 (Idaho 1978)).
248. COLO. REv. STAT. § 19-5-103.5.
249. COLO. REv. STAT. § 19-5-103(7)(a)(II) (2004).
250. See COLO. REv. STAT. § 19-5-103.5(1)(b)(I).
251. COLO. REV . STAT. §§ 19-5-103.5(1 )(b)(IV), -104(7)(a)(2004). The statute requires
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Louisiana has dealt with independent adoptions by moving in stages from
permitting birth parents to revoke consent any time before a final decree to
making consents irrevocable if given more than four days after birth.252 In
1960 Louisiana's cut-off for revocation was changed from the final to the
interlocutory decree,253 and in 1979, to thirty days, with revocation triggering
a best interest determination rather than automatic return of the child. 254 North
Carolina shortened its period for revocation in a series of reductions,
ultimately reducing the pre-1983 period of six months to the present period of
seven days.255 In South Carolina before 1986, the state courts had discretion
to permit revocation of consent until the final decree of adoption, although the
state supreme court noted in 1985 that '''the more modem trend disallows the
revocation of consent voluntarily given particularly where the adoptive parents
have taken the child into their home in reliance upon the consent. ",256 By
statute since 1986, South Carolina does not permit revocation of a voluntary
consent given any time after the birth.257
Tennessee and Texas have recently limited their consent or revocation
periods but nonetheless retain periods considerably longer than average.
Tennessee law prior to 1986 provided a right to revoke consent for periods of
thirty and ninety days respectively in agency and independent adoptions?58
From 1986 to 1995, the periods were each reduced to fifteen days and limited

that the affidavit advise the parent that consent may be withdrawn anytime before it is filed with
the petition in court, but it does not state that the affidavit must inform the parent that the
affidavit and petition may be filed four days after the birth. See COLO. REv. STAT. § 19-5103.5( I )(b )(I)-(II). Apparently, there had been delays in scheduling the court hearings at which
parents would appear and be examined by the court. Telephone Interview with Karen Kottmeir,
Participant in Lobbying Efforts (Nov. 4, 2003). Rather than addressing the problem of the
delays and adopting time limits within which hearings must be set, the law eliminated the
hearings and provided for pre-birth consents.
252. LA. CH. CODE. arts. 1123, 1130 (2004).
253. See Moreland v. Craft, 244 So. 2d 37, 41 (La. Ct. App. 1971).
254. See In re J.M.P., 528 So. 2d 1002, 1007 (La. 1988). In 1970 additional safeguards
were added; the birth mother may not consent before the fifth day after birth and must be
represented by an attorney at the execution of the consent. /d.
255. Consent is required in independent adoptions and agency adoptions in which the
mother has not already relinquished the child to an agency. The time during which consent
could be revoked was reduced in 1983 from six to three months. 1983 N.C. Sess. Laws ch.
83, § 1. In 1987 it was reduced to thirty days if consent was given to the director of Social
Services ofa licensed child placing agency. 1987 N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 541, § 1. In 1991 it was
reduced to thirty days in all circumstances. 1991 N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 667, § 1. In 1995 it was
reduced to twenty-one days if the child was younger than three months old and otherwise to
seven days. 1995 N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 457, § 2. In 2001 it was reduced to seven days in all
circumstances. 2001 N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 150, § 10.
256. Phillips v. Baker, 325 S.E.2d 533, 535 (S.C. 1985) (quoting Ellison v. Camby, 236
S.E.2d 197, 198 (S.c. 1977».
257. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1720 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 2004).
258. TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-1I7(b)(1984).
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to situations in which an adoption petition had not yet been filed.259 Under
current law, a mother may not surrender her child until the fourth day after
birth and may revoke her consent within ten days,260 gaining return of the child
unless "the child would likely suffer immediate harm to the child's health and
safety. ,,261 In 1995 Texas instituted a forty-eight-hour waiting period before
parents may relinquish. 262 In 1997 it eliminated an option of making
relinquishments in independent adoptions revocable until the termination of
parental rights or the decree of adoption. 263 Instead, Texas made these
relinquishments either (1) revocable for ten days or (2) irrevocable, as was
previously permitted, for a period stated in the document, up to sixty days in
length. 264 In an earlier period, parental consents in independent adoptions had
been revocable until the final decree. 265
In Maryland in recent years, the legislature has rejected repeated attempts
to shorten the state's thirty-day revocation period,266 which was reduced from
ninety to thirty days in 1992.267 Bills were unsuccessfully introduced in 1996
seeking to reduce the period to seven days, in 1997 to eight days, in 2000 to
fifteen days, and in 2003 to fourteen days.268 Like Maryland, California and
Pennsylvania are among the states that have the very longest revocation
periods in the nation, but they have shortened their periods in recent years. In
1994 California shortened the revocation period in independent adoptions
from 120 days to ninety days and shortened it again in 2001 from ninety days
to thirty days.269 In California the mother can waive the revocation period
available in independent adoptions; however, California law affords a number
of additional safeguards to promote deliberate and final decisions. 27o

259. TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-117(b) (Supp. 1989).
260. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 36-1-111(d)(3), -112(a)(l)(A) (2001 & Supp. 2004).
261. TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-112(e)(2)(A) (2001).
262. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 16l.l03(a)(l) (Vernon 2002 & Supp. 2004-05)(Historical
and Statutory Notes).
263. See 1997 Tex. Gen. Laws ch. 561, § 9.
264. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 16l.l03, .1035 (Vernon 2002 & Supp. 2004-05).
265. Hendricks v. Curry, 401 S.W.2d 796, 800 (Tex. 1966).
266. MD. CODEANN.,FAM. LAW § 5-311(c)(2004).
267. 1992 Md. Laws 511.
268. H.B. 882,2004 Leg., 418th Sess. (Md.); H.B. 61, 2000 Leg., 414th Sess. (Md.); H.B.
1382,1997 Leg., 41lth Sess. (Md.); H.B. 550,1996 Leg., 410th Sess. (Md.).
269. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 8814.5(b) (West 2004) (Historical and Statutory Notes).
270. For example, waiver of the right to consent may only be signed in the presence of
designated authorities and may not be signed before an interview by a designated authority.
CAL. FAM. CODE § 8814.5(a)(2)(A), (c). In independent adoptions, adoption providers are
required to advise birth parents of alternatives to adoption; alternative types of adoptions; their
"right to separate legal counsel paid for by the prospective adoptive parents"; and their right to
a minimum of three counseling sessions, paid for by the prospective adoptive parents and given
by a counselor who does not have a contractual relationship with the adoptive parents, the
adoptive parents' attorney, or any other individual or organization performing a service for the
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Pennsylvania recently made its period for revocation both more definite and
in some cases shorter. Before mid-2004, consent could not be given less than
seventy-two hours after birth and could be revoked until the earlier of either
the termination of parental rights or the decree of adoption,271 a period of time
that could be several weeks or months.272 While consent still may not be given
sooner than seventy-two hours after birth, the period for withdrawal is now set
at thirty days.273
VI. PROBLEMS IN PRACTICE
I have heard of cases in North America, tragically, in which adoption
consents have been signed even before the birth, or very soon after the
birth. I have also heard of cases where attempts to revoke the consent
the day after it had been signed have failed. 274
Evelyn Robinson, Australian social worker and author
What can be learned from appellate opinions about circumstances that
have led to conflicts between adoptive parents and mothers who initially
consented but then attempted to withdraw their consent to the adoption oftheir
newborn infants? Litigated cases that resulted in appellate decisions do not
necessarily represent every type of situation in which conflicts arise or the
relative incidence of different situations, and some decisions reveal little of the
circumstances that led to the litigation. The opinions nonetheless provide a
valuable account of troubling cases and a valuable resource for contemplating
whether following the best practices discussed in Part IV could have prevented
conflicts, and if so, whether different legal rules could have promoted these
practices.
The stories that appellate opinions relate fall roughly into four distinct
categories. In one group of cases, the dominant reported fact is that consent
was signed within hours or within a day or two of birth and, very often, was
almost immediately regretted. In another group, two different but interrelated

adoptive parents for a fee. CAL. FAM. CODE § 8801.5(c), (e) (West 2004). Also, the adoption
service provider must offer to interview birth parents within ten days after the placement for
adoption, at which interview the provider re-advises birth parents of their rights, but if the
interview does not take place, the provider is to notify designated authorities. CAL. F AM. CODE
§ 8801. 7 (West 2004).
271. See 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2711(c) (West 2001).
272. See Martha Raffaele, Law Limits Withdrawing Consentfor Adoption, INTELLIGENCER
J. (Lancaster, Pa.), Mar. 30,2004, at All. In agency adoptions, the earliest a hearing could be
held on a parent's petition to relinquish was thirteen days after the birth. 23 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. §§ 2501 ( a), 2503( a)(West 2001). In an independent adoption, the earliest a hearing could
be held on such a petition was forty-three days. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 2502(a), 2503(a)
(West 2001).
273. 2004 Pa. Legis. Servo 21, § 2711 (West).
274. ROBINSON, supra note 56, at 2.
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factors are prominent. One factor is a failure either to initiate communication
or resolve conflicts among the mother, father, and family members. The other
factor is a lack oftimely awareness of resources available to the mother to help
her raise her child. In a third and somewhat different group of cases, mothers
made timely revocations under what were apparently confusing laws that may
invite litigation because they permit "revocation" but dictate judicial "best
interests determinations" rather than return of the children. In these cases,
courts engage in what would be considered an unlawful exercise in other
circumstances, that is, deciding whether the child should be raised by a fit
biological parent or by unrelated third parties with whom the child has lived
for at most a few days or weeks before the revocation. Finally, a fourth source
of conflict is apparent in situations in which mothers have consented in
reliance on open adoption arrangements that are not legally enforceable. In
each group of cases, the mothers almost without exception did not give their
consents in person either before a judge or before an official designated by a
court or another government agency.
A. Quick Consents, Quick Regrets

In the first group of reported cases, we learn merely that the mother
consented shortly after birth and soon regretted her decision, a decision that
might or might not have been different had the law required a longer period
of time before consent could be given or could become irrevocable. It appears
that these adoptions generally were not conducted in ways that facilitated
deliberate and firm decisions. In most of the cases, the mothers received no
counseling, and in almost all of them, they did not have legal representation.
In the cases in which the mother received some counseling, it was generally
either with adoption agency representatives or through very brief contacts with
hospital social workers. In two of the cases, the social workers were actually
colleagues of one of the prospective adoptive parents.
In some of the cases, the irrevocable consent was given within one to four
days after birth, even though the possibility of adoption was discussed for the
first time after the birth. In a 2001 Mississippi case, In re Adoption of
J.MM,275 the sixteen-year-old mother hid her pregnancy from her parents
until she gave birth in their home. 276 In the ensuing upheaval, her family
immediately contacted a private adoption agency whose representatives visited
her twice that day, took custody of the baby the next day, and as permitted by
Mississippi law, obtained her signature on the irrevocable surrender two days
later. 277 The consent document was notarized by a representative of the
agency.278 In the court's opinion, there was no indication that the mother was

275.
276.
277.
278.

796 So. 2d 975 (Miss. 2001).
Id. at 977.
Jd. at 978.
Jd.
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offered counseling or that she had legal representation.279 She unsuccessfully
appealed the adoption decree, which was entered less than thirty days after she
signed the consent, on the grounds that she had signed under duress or as a
result of undue influence and that her constitutional rights had been violated
by the court's failure to rule on her motion to appoint a guardian ad litem for
her.280
An older mother in a 2001 Texas case gave birth at home and then drove
herself, the infant, and her older children to the hospital. 281 She "told hospital
employees that she was divorced, was having financial difficulties, and did not
think she could take care of another child.,,282 After discussions with a social
worker contacted by the hospital, the mother on the second day after the birth
signed an affidavit of relinquishment, giving a private agency the right to place
the child for adoption.283 She had no legal representation. 284 Under state law,
her consent was irrevocable because it was given to a licensed agency more
than forty-eight hours after the birth.285
A 1993 dispute in Missouri involved an older mother who feared her child
would have Down's Syndrome and whose doctor believed, because of
complications during pregnancy, that the child might be stillbom. 286 During
her labor, she told a nurse she did not think she could "handle" a child with
mental disabilities. 287 A few hours after she gave birth to a healthy baby girl,
a nurse at the hospital called a fellow employee who wished to adopt. 288 The
fellow employee then called the hospital social worker, who told him "they
had not been able to get a commitment from the mother.,,289 The next
morning, he and his wife brought a consent form to the hospital and asked the
social worker to obtain the mother's consent. "Approximately 20 to 30
minutes later, [the social worker] returned with the consent form signed and
notarized.,,290 Later that day, the couple took the baby home to Arkansas,
where they petitioned to adopt the child. Two days after they took the baby,

279. See id. at 977-78.
280. Id. at 980-83.
281. Denman v. Alternatives in Motion, No. 14-99-01262-CV, 2001 Tex. App. LEXIS
336, at *1 (Tex. Ct. App. Jan. 18,2001).
282. Id. at *1-2.
283. Id. at *2.
284. See id. at *1-3.
285. See id. at *2 nn.l & 3. Had the relinquishment been given in an independent
adoption, it could have provided that it was irrevocable for a stated period up to sixty days;
however, ifit did not include such a provision, it would have been revocable for ten days. TEx.
FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 161.103(e)-(f), .1035 (Vernon 2002).
286. In re Baby Girl_, 850 S.W.2d 64, 66 (Mo. 1993).
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. Id.

2005]

CONSENTS TO ADOPTION

551

the mother contacted an attorney, seeking the return of her child.291 More than
two and a half years later, the Missouri Supreme Court remanded the case for
a custody decision that would tum on the child's best interests. 292
In a 1989 West Virginia case, although the mother was counseled before
the birth by a state protective services worker, the possibility of relinquishment
was not mentioned to her.293 The day after the birth, the mother signed a form
placing the child in foster care while she considered adoption; three days later,
she signed the relinquishment form; seven days later, she asked if the baby
could be returned to her. 294 Approximately three weeks after she made her
request, the child was placed for adoption.295 The trial court held that she had
not been subjected to the kind of duress that invalidates consent,296 and the
affirming appellate court noted that her "beliefthat she had ten days to retrieve
the child appears to stem from a lack of attention on her part.,,297 "[I]t appears
that if there was a misunderstanding, it stems primarily from both [her] and her
mother's failure to listen to Ms. Velas when [Ms. Vel as] explained the
relinquishment papers. ,,298
Quick changes of heart after giving consent also occurred in cases in
which, although adoption had been contemplated before the birth, there was
no indication in the opinions that the mothers were offered or received
counseling services. The birth mother in a 2003 Indiana case made
arrangements before the birth with the prospective adoptive parents, one of
whom worked with her maternal grandmother. 299 She signed the consent
prepared by the adoptive parents' attorney approximately six weeks before the
birth and "ratified" it after the birth,300 as permitted by judicial decision in
Indiana and perhaps in a small number of other states. 301 She ratified it by
delivering the child into the custody of the prospective adoptive parents, who
took the child home from the hospital. 302 Thirteen days later, the mother and

291. Jd.
292. Id. at 71. The Missouri Supreme Court remanded the case for consideration of
(l) whether to permit revocation of consent, keeping at the "pinnacle" of the decision the
child's best interests, and (2) whether the child's best interests would be served by remaining
with the prospective adoptive parents; by being returned to the mother or the father, with whom
the mother lived; or by some other disposition. Id. at 70-71. The basis for the ruling was the
parties' failure to comply with state law requirements for transferring custody of the child and
for removing the child from Missouri to Arkansas. See id. at 66-70.
293. Baby Boy R. v. Velas, 386 S.E.2d 839,840 (W.Va. 1989).
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. Id. at 840-41.
297. Id. at 843.
298. Id. at 842.
299. In re Adoption ofInfant Child Baxter, 799 N.E.2d 1057, 1058 (Ind. 2003).
300. Id. at 1059.
301. Jd. at 1061-62 (citing cases in accord from Arizona, Florida, and New York).
302. Jd. at 1059.
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father changed their minds, but under the state's law, their consent was
irrevocable. 303 The mother and her mother contacted the prospective adoptive
parents "on several occasions in the weeks following the child's birth in an
attempt to revoke ... consent to the adoption and reclaim custody of the child.
These informal efforts failed."304
In two Florida cases, the mothers likewise made adoption arrangements
before the births of their children and also apparently received no
counseling. 305 The mother in a 1988 case did not have independent
representation, but the attorney acting as an intermediary had "explained the
available options" to her.306 She also had a mandatory interview with a state
Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services caseworker "to insure that
[her] consent was informed and voluntary.,,307 She consented to the adoption
the day after the birth but on the following day asked the attorney to void her
consent. 308 The appellate court affirmed the dismissal of her habeas corpus
petition, despite what it viewed as a "harsh result.,,309
In a case decided three years earlier, the mother in an independent
adoption consented several hours after the birth, which the prospective
adoptive mother had traveled from Florida to Pennsylvania to attend. 3lO The
third day after the birth, the mother's attorney told the prospective adoptive
mother that the mother had changed her mind.3II "Nevertheless, [the
prospective adoptive mother] departed with the child as planned," and the
Florida courts later entered and affirmed a final judgment of adoption. 312
The mother in a 1996 Texas case had responded to a New York couple's
advertisement in TV Guide, had visited the couple, and had arranged with them
for the adoption of her unborn child.313 She signed the relinquishment twentysix hours after the birth but changed her mind shortly thereafter. 314 There is
no indication that she had independent legal representation or was offered

303. See id. at 1060.
304. In re Adoption ofInfant Child Baxter, 778 N.E.2d 417, 419-20 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002).
305. Hindman v. Bischoff, 534 So. 2d 743 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988); In re Adoption of
c.L.W., 467 So. 2d 1106 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
306. Hindman, 534 So. 2d at 744.
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. ld. at 745.
310. C.L.W.,467So.2datll08.
311. Id.
312. Id.atll08,1111.
313. Sims v. Adoption Alliance, 922 S.W.2d 213, 214 (Tex. Ct. App. 1996).
314. See id. Texas cases with similar facts include Swinney v. Mosher, 830 S. W.2d 187,
190 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992), in which the court found that the birth mother signed the consent
documents on the day after the birth and advised the adoptive parents on the day after signing
the consent that she had changed her mind and In re c.T., 749 S.W.2d 214, 215 (Tex. Ct. App.
1988), in which the court found that the birth mother signed the consent on the fourth day after
the birth and attempted to have the child returned the next day.
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counseling.315 To the contrary, the agency arranging the adoption-apparently
knowing she had changed her mind-"made every effort to finalize the
adoption" in the two weeks following her consent before a new law would
apply and impose a forty-eight-hour waiting period.316 The agency's failure
to meet this deadline led to the reversal of the lower court's termination of
parental rights, an outcome that the concurring justice found "tragic.,,3J7 He
lamented, "If the affidavit had been signed twenty-two (22) hours later than
it was, Baby Girl Sims would remain the adopted daughter of her new and
obviously very devoted and loving parents.,,318
In a 1997 New York case, the mother gave her consent approximately
eleven hours after the birth, while "crying and shaking" and "so anxious to
leave [the hospital] that she ... did not read the documents.,,319 The mother
had responded to a newspaper advertisement and met with the prospective
adoptive parents about five months before the birth.320 The prospective
adoptive parents' attorney told the birth mother that she could select an
attorney herself, but the attorney also recommended one.32I She met with the
recommended attorney, whose fees were paid by the prospective adoptive
parents. 322 She did not read the documents she signed, and the attorney did not
read them to her or explain them.323 The court, expressing disapproval of
consents executed just hours or a few days after birth, held the consent invalid
because it did not comply with the statutory requirements that the document
be explained to the birth mother and that she be given a copy.324
In a 1990 New York case, the mother gave her consent two days after the
birth but revoked it before the prospective adoptive parents took custody the
following day.325 The intermediate court found that the birth mother's lawyer
had violated New York law by providing legal services to both her and the
prospective adoptive parents and that he had physically transferred the baby
"in flagrant disregard of [her] instructions. ,,326 The court of appeals approved
the trial court's return of the child,327 although as the dissent in the court below

315. Sims, 922 S.W.2d at 214-15.
316. Id. at217.
317. Id.at218.
318. Id.
319. In re Adoption of Baby Boy, 667 N.Y.S.2d 635,638 (Sur. Ct. 1997).
320. See id. at 637.
321. Id.
322. Id.
323. See id. at 637-38.
324. See id. at 640-41.
325. See In re Adoption of Samuel, 562 N.Y.S.2d 278, 279 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990).
326. Id.
327. In re Samuel, 581 N.E.2d 1338, 1339 (N.Y. 1991)(holding that her attorney did not
have the authority under the circumstances to place the child).
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had noted, timely revocation under New York law ordinarily requires a best
interests hearing rather than return of the child. 328
In other cases, mothers had a number of meetings with agency workers or
were offered some kind of counseling. In a Nebraska case decided in 1995,
a mother of four children decided on adoption before the birth because "she
did not feel she could or wanted to raise another child. ,,329 She contacted the
private adoption agency some four months before the birth and met with
agency employees on five occasions. 33o She did not have legal representation,
and the day after the birth she consented to the adoption in the presence of
agencyemployees. 331 Less than three days later, she requested that the child
be returned.332 The Nebraska Court of Appeals rejected her claim that she had

328. See Samuel, 562 N.Y.S.2d at 280 (Pine, J., dissenting). The court of appeals insisted
that it was not altering the law:
As respondent urges, it would be absurd to conclude that every consent that is privately
signed and immediately withdrawn by a birth parent nonetheless triggers the fonnal
revocation mechanism that puts a birth parent on equal footing with a potential adoptive
parent. ...
. . . We emphasize that, contrary to appellants' argument, our analysis adds no
requirement of delivery of the consent document, or any other requirement to the statute.
Samuel, 581 N.E.2d at 1339.
In cases in Oregon and Washington, mothers attempted to revoke their consents by invoking
the federal Indian Child Welfare Act (lCWA). The fifteen-year-old mother in the 1994 Oregon
case signed a relinquishment on the day ofthe birth and thirteen days later filed a document
seeking to revoke her consent. In re Adoption of Quinn, 881 P.2d 795, 797-98 (Or. 1994). She
also had contacted the prospective adoptive parents before the birth. Id. at 797. The
prospective parents had hired a separate lawyer for her to advise her about the adoption process.
Id. In the ensuing litigation, she claimed, contrary to an earlier assertion, that the ICWA
applied to the adoption. Id. at 798, 799. Under the ICWA, binding consent may not be given
for ten days after birth, and a birth parent may revoke consent until the final decree of adoption,
25 U.S.c. § I 913(a), (c)(2000), but the Supreme Court of Oregon ultimately held thatthere had
not been sufficient admissible evidence introduced to establish that the ICWA applied. Quinn,
881 P.2d at 801.
In the 1992 Washington case in which the mother received counseling and consulted with
family, friends, and women who had placed their children for adoption, the mother signed a
consent two weeks before the birth. In re Adoption ofInfant Boy Crews, 825 P .2d 305, 306-07
(Wash. 1992). The court approved the consent two days after the birth, and the mother
requested the return ofthe child either four or eight days later. Id. at 307. The Supreme Court
of Washington held that the ICWA does not apply when the child is "not being removed from
an Indian cultural setting" and that even if it applied, it would not invalidate the concluded
tennination of parental rights. Id. at 310-1 I.
329. Jones v. Child Saving Inst., No. A-94-710, 1995 Neb. App. LEXIS 117, at *5 (Neb.
Ct. App. Apr. 4, \995).
330. Id.
331. Id. at *7-8.
332. Jd. at *I.
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not understood the finality of her consent and concluded that "[a] change of
mind is not sufficient to invalidate a relinquishment. ,,333
In an earlier case in which the mother decided on adoption during her
pregnancy, the mother met many times with the private adoption agency
director, who was also a caseworker. 334 At the first meeting, the caseworker
testified that "he showed [her] all the documents she ultimately signed and ...
they went over the documents in detail. ,,335 The mother signed the required
forms in the hospital two days after the birth. 336 Two days later she requested
the return of her baby.337 She claimed she had been told she would have six
months to change her mind; the agency director testified that he had explained
that the adoptive parents would finalize the adoption in six months. 338 The
Supreme Court of Nebraska held that she failed to satisfy her burden of
proving that the relinquishment was involuntary.339
The mother in a 1998 Oregon case consented on the day after the birth to
what was to be an open adoption arrangement, but nine days later she
delivered a written revocation to the adoption agency.340 A couple of months
before the birth, she had contacted the agency because it arranged open
adoptions in which birth parents could "have an ongoing relationship with the
child and the adoptive parents.,,341 She had met the prospective adoptive
parents twice and spoken with them in telephone calls. 342 After the birth, the
adoption agency counselor read the required documents to her but did not
explain them. 343 The mother, who did not have legal representation, believed
on the basis of previous explanations that she had six months during which she
could revoke her consent, becoming liable for all costS. 344 She retained
counsel and filed objections in the two counties in which she believed the
adoption petition might be filed. 345 It was in a third county that the petition
was subsequently filed and concluded, as permitted by the documents she had
signed, without notice to her. 346 She sued to set the adoption aside. 347 Two
and a half years later, the intermediate court of appeals allowed her suit to

333.
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.
340.
341.
342.
343.
344.
345.
346.
347.

Id. at *27.
Hohndorfv. Watson, 482 N.W.2d 241,242 (Neb. 1992).
Id.
Id. at 243.
Id. at 244.
See id. at 242, 244.
Id. at 244.
In re Adoption of Baby S., 956 P.2d 226,227 (Or. Ct. App. 1998).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 228.
Id. at 226.
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proceed on the ground she was not a party barred by law from questioning the
validity of the adoption decree. 348
In a 2001 New York case in which adoption was not contemplated before
the birth, it appears that, as in the Kansas case recounted at length in Part II,
the mother's consent was quickly taken and acted upon despite the fact that
she was clearly experiencing a particularly high level of ambivalence. 349
During her pregnancy and on the day the child was born, the eighteen-year-old
mother expressed her desire to keep the child/sO but the next day she executed
a document surrendering custody to an adoption agency after a Department of
Social Services worker told her that the Department was going to file a neglect
petition and seek temporary custody of her child "due to its concerns that [she]
was unable to properly care for him."m According to the court, it was clear
two days later that she intended to challenge the surrender. 352

B. Family and Resource Issues
A "sadly familiar pattem,,,353 in the words of one court, involves a failure
of the mother and either the father or family members to have adequately
resolved differences and fully come to terms with the mother's situation. 354 In

348. Id. at 229. In a recent Missouri case, a Spanish-speaking mother met eight or nine
times with an agency coordinator and an interpreter before the birth, gave her consent nine days
after the birth at a hearing before a family court commissioner, and then attempted orally to
withdraw her consent during the following three or four days. Baby Girl P. v. A.M., 159
S. W.3d 862 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005). The Missouri Court of Appeals remanded the case, holding
that under the statute permitting withdrawal of consent until it is reviewed and accepted by a
judge, there is no requirement that the withdrawal be in writing. Id. at 865. In Yopp v. Batt,
467 N.W.2d 868, 872 (Neb. 1991), the birth mother's doctor directed her to an attorney before
the birth, and the attorney arranged the adoption. On the second day after the birth, she signed
the papers after declining a hospital social worker's offer to discuss the relinquishment. Id. at
873. She testified in court that the next day "she told her mother that she felt she did the wrong
thing and that her mother told her to think about it for awhile." Id. at 874. Three days later, she
"indicated to her mother that she wanted the baby back." Id. at 874. She then told her father
about the pregnancy and birth and with him, met with the attorney to say she wanted the baby
back. Id. The denial of her writ of habeas corpus was affirmed. Id. at 871, 881.
349. In re Baby Boy 0., 733 N.Y.S.2d 768, 769 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001).
350. Id.
351. Id.
352. Id. at 771. The court found that she had revoked her consent within the thirty days
permitted by the law applicable at that time, and therefore she was entitled to a best interests
hearing to determine custody of the child. Id.
353. In re J.M.P., 528 So. 2d 1002, 1004 (La. 1988).
354. In addition to the cases discussed in the text, see generally In re Adoption of Baby
Doe, No. 03AP-917, 2004 Ohio App. LEXIS 666 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 17, 2004), a case in
which the court found that the birth parents were persuaded to withdraw consent after their
parents learned of the birth and expressed strong disapproval and In re Adoption ofInfant Boy,
573 N.E.2d 753, 755, 758 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989), a case in which the court found that the birth
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a 1988 Louisiana case, for example, an eighteen-year-old who had concealed
her pregnancy for six months consented to the adoption a week after the birth
of her child. 355 Her parents had given her an ultimatum that she could not
continue to live with them if she kept her child. 356 When the lawyer who
placed the child with the prospective adoptive parents came to the mother's
house for her to execute the surrender, he brought his law partner to act as her
attorney and advise her of her rights. 357 She apparently had not been offered
or received any counseling. Some time after she gave her consent, her parents
"realized that [she] couldn't get over the loss of the child.,,358 They testified
"that they had experienced a change of heart because of the suffering [she] had
endured, that they regretted their actions ... , and that they now stood ready
to support" her.359 The Louisiana Supreme Court held that her surrender was
valid but remanded the case for a new best interests hearing, available at that
time in Louisiana in the case of a timely revocation. 360
In a 1998 Texas case in which a nineteen-year-old mother unsuccessfully
appealed the termination of her parental rights, the mother had kept her
pregnancy a secret from her family and had driven herself to the hospital,
where she told staff members that she intended to place the child for
adoption. 361 Some hours after the birth, she met with a hospital social worker
who discussed adoption procedures with her, "presented her with other
options," and contacted a private adoption agency at the mother's request. 362
An agency representative telephoned the same day, and the following day
another agency employee met with her at the hospital to "explain[] the
adoption process and the legal documents necessary to initiate the process.,,363
The third day after the birth, she signed the final papers, relinquishing the
child to the agency.364 Shortly thereafter, following a "confrontation" when
her parents received a bill from the hospital, she sought return of the child
from the agency, which was in the process of placing the child with the
adoptive family.365 The Court of Appeals of Texas held, inter alia, that the
legislature intended "to make an irrevocable affidavit of relinquishment

mother's father initially insisted upon adoption but changed his mind in part due to pressure
from his own parents.
355. J.MP., 528 So. 2d. at 1004-05.
356. Id. at 1005.
357. Id.
358. Pontiffv. Behrens, 518 So. 2d 23, 27 (La. Ct. App. 1987), affd in part by In re
I.M.P., 528 So. 2d. 1002 (La. 1988).
359. J.MP., 528 So. 2d at 1005.
360. Id. at 1017.
361. In re Baby Girl Bruno, 974 S.W.2d 401, 402 (Tex. Ct. App. 1998).
362. Id.
363. Id.
364. Id. at 403.
365. See id.
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sufficient evidence on which the trial court can make a finding that tennination
is in the best interest of the child. ,,366
In another case in which the mother concealed her pregnancy and also had
her first contacts about adoption after the birth, the mother was counseled by
a hospital social worker. 367 On the third day after the birth, she consented to
an adoption by another hospital employee. 368 The mother revoked her consent
when her parents learned of the birth almost six weeks later but still within
New York's forty-five-day revocation period. 369 More than a year later, in a
1989 decision, she was granted the right to a best interests hearing "at the
convenience of counsel. ,,370
In other cases, mothers who received some fonn of counseling while
pregnant nevertheless similarly sought to revoke their consents after their
families learned of the births. In a 1988 Utah case, a twenty-one-year-old
woman contacted an agency three months before the birth and received about
thirteen hours of counseling from the agency.371 She relinquished her rights
in court thirty hours after the birth.372 A few days later, she "disclosed her
pregnancy, the child's birth, and the planned adoption to her own mother ....
She then contacted [the agency] seeking to revoke her consent.,,373 Her
subsequently filed motion to set aside the consent was granted by the district
court but vacated on appeal. 374 In a 1994 California case, the adoption agency
representative discussed with the college freshman mother the possibility of
raising the child and encouraged her to tell her parents about the birth. 375 The
mother refused to consider telling family or friends because "[s]he could not
disappoint her parents. ,,376 When she eventually confided in them several
months later, they "told her there must be something she could do to get the
baby back."m She and the birth father unsuccessfully sought rescission of
their relinquishments. 378
In the well-known, lengthy, and complex adoption contest known as the
"Baby Jessica" case, which arose in Iowa in the early 1990s, the mother's
parents knew of the pregnancy before the birth and opposed adoption. 379 Cara
Clausen, the unmarried mother who lived in the small fanning community in

366.
367.
368.
369.
370.
371.
372.
373.
374.
375.
376.
377.
378.
379.

/d. at 405.
In re Baby Girl B., 544 N.Y.S.2d 963, 964 (Sur. Ct. 1989).
/d.

Id.
Id. at 966.
In re Adoption of Infant Anonymous, 760 P.2d 916,917 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 918, 920.
Tyler v. Children's Home Soc'y, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 291, 295-96 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).
Id. at 296.
Id. at 298.
Id. at 298,315.
Lucinda Franks, The War for Baby Clausen, NEW YORKER, Mar. 22, 1993, at 56.
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which she had grown up, was "overcome with shame.,,380 The prospective
adoptive parents' lawyer, according to scholar Joan Heifetz Hollinger, took her
consent despite "classic warnings":
These included [her] efforts to deny or hide her pregnancy until shortly
before she gave birth, her reluctance to discuss her plans with close friends
or family members, her insistence on relinquishing the infant despite her own
mother's entreaties to the contrary, and her wariness of saying much about
the circumstances of the conception or her relationship to the birth father. It
is not surprising that several days after leaving the hospital, [she] began to
regret her decision. 381

The counseling she received consisted of a brief telephone call with the
hospital's social worker. 382 The lawyer representing the prospective adoptive
parents, Jan and Roberta DeBoer, "may have led [Clausen] to believe that he
was representing [only the birth parents] .... Alternatively, he may have told
[her] that he could represent and provide legal services to [both parties]. ,,383
The lawyer first contacted her two days before the birth. 384 One day before the
birth, she misnamed as the father the man she had begun dating when she
broke off her relationship with the child's actual biological father. 385 Forty
hours after the birth, rather than the seventy-two hours required by Iowa law,
she signed her consent. 386 Within three weeks, her parental rights were
terminated and the DeBoers were awarded a temporary custody order. 387
Two days later she informed the biological father about the child. 388 Truck
driver Dan Schmidt, who was due to leave on a haul the next day, immediately
asked his mother "to see what she could do to 'retrieve' the baby.,,389
Approximately two weeks later, he filed a request to vacate the terminations
of parental rights. 390 In the meantime, Clausen had filed a petition to revoke
the release of custody, 391 and the DeBoers had learned that she "want[ ed] Jessi
back.,,392 The litigation between the two couples was conducted in the courts
of Iowa and Michigan, where the DeBoers lived, and culminated in an
380.

Id.

381. Joan Heifetz Hollinger, Adoption and Aspiration, 2 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'y 15,
19 (1995).

382.
383.

Id.
Id.

384. Marian L. Faupel, The "Baby Jessica Case" and the Claimed Conflict Between
Children's and Parents' Rights, 40 WAYNE L. REv. 285, 316-17 (1994).
385. Id.at286,316-17.
386. Id. at 316.
387. Id.at317.
388. Id.
389. In re B.G.C., 496 N.W.2d 239, 246 (Iowa 1992).
390. Id.
391. Faupel, supra note 384, at 317.
392.

ROBBY DEBOER, LOSING JESSICA 23 (1994).
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unsuccessful application to the U.S. Supreme Court for a stay of the Supreme
Court of Michigan's order that the child be returned to her biological
parents. 393 The litigation had included an Iowa trial court order to return the
child,394 issued when the child was eleven months old and affirmed eight
months later by the Iowa Supreme Court. 395 When the child was almost two
and a half years old, the litigation was finally concluded and the child returned
to Clausen and Schmidt, who had married and had had another child. 396
A failure of the mother and father to resolve their relationship lay behind
a 1989 Florida case in which the father of the child opposed the adoption but
had not agreed to marry the mother when she consented to adoption two days
after the birth.397 The father then proposed marriage and came to Florida,
where the mother had gone to give birth and place the child. 398 "[W]ithin
days" of giving her consent, the mother attempted to withdraw it. 399 The
parents subsequently married and unsuccessfully sought return of the child.
The Florida Supreme Court ultimately held that the mother's consent was
irrevocable and that the father had abandoned the child by failing to provide
enough support during her pregnancy.400
Economic distress and a lack of information about available help were the
primary issues in a 1999 Florida case.401 The mother, who was unemployed
and caring for a young daughter, contacted the adoption agency during her
eighth month of pregnancy and consented to her son's adoption three days
after his birth when she returned to the hospital and met with agency
representatives in the hospitallobby.402 When she then returned home and told
friends what had happened, they assured her they would support and help
her.403 Less than twenty-four hours after signing the papers, she called the
agency to say that she had changed her mind. 404 When the Florida District
Court of Appeal subsequently affirmed the denial of her motion to set aside
the consent, she was living rent-free with a friend and working full-time as a
housekeeper. 405 The court, recognizing the "seemingly harsh result,"
suggested "that a 'cooling-off' period might be a wise option for the
legislature to consider.'",o6 The Florida legislature in 2001 provided a

393.
394.
395.
396.
397.
398.
399.
400.
401.
402.
403.
404.
405.
406.

Faupel, supra note 384, at 3 17-3 1.
Id.at317.
B.G.C., 496 N.W.2d at 241; Faupel, supra note 384, at 317.
Faupel, supra note 384, at 331.
In re Adoption of Doe, 543 So. 2d 741,742-43 (Fla. 1989).
Id.
Id. at 743.
See id. at 743-44, 749.
See T.R. v. Adoption Servs., Inc., 724 So. 2d 1235 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
Id.

Id. at 1236.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1237.
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revocation period in agency adoptions of three business days or until
placement with adoptive parents, whichever is later. 407 In independent
adoptions in which placements are made directly from the hospital, the
legislature provided that irrevocable consent could not be given for forty-eight
hours or until the mother is fit to be released, whichever is earlier. 408

C. Best Interests Determinations
A class of cases has arisen under state laws that permit withdrawal of
consent if a court finds it to be in the child's best interest. A number of
jurisdictions include the possibility of a best interests determination as a
safeguard during the time between the execution of an irrevocable consent or
the expiration of a revocation period and the entry of an interlocutory or final
adoption decree. 409 New York, however, frames its law differently. When
consent has been given extrajudicially, mothers have forty-five days "to
revoke" their consent, but their revocation triggers a best interests
determination in which they enjoy no preference, rather than automatic return
of the child. 4lO Alabama also provides that revocation within fourteen rather
than five days triggers a best interests determination. 411
It would not be surprising if a mother had difficulty appreciating that her
"right to revoke" does not encompass a right to raise her child, especially
when the mother is not educated in the law, has just given birth, and is in the
stressful situation of considering placing her child for adoption. New York
case law suggests mothers find the system at least confusing, if not actually
misleading. In a 1999 New York case, for example, the birth parents claimed
they "subjectively believed that they could unconditionally revoke their
consents and automatically regain custody" during the revocation period, but
the court found that a "failure to understand all of the legal ramifications of

407. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.082(7)(a) (Supp. 2005).
408. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.082(4)(b). The law has been changed again since then; in all
types of adoptions, a birth mother may not consent until forty-eight hours after the birth or "the
day the birth mother has been notified in writing, either on her patient chart or in release
paperwork, that she is fit to be released from the licensed hospital or birth center, whichever is
earlier." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.082(4)(b). In the case ofa newborn, the consent is irrevocable.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.082(4)(b).
409. These jurisdictions include, for example, Alaska (until decree), Arkansas (until
interlocutory decree), Hawaii (after consent and placement and until decree), Indiana (until final
decree), Nebraska (until agency takes full responsibility or until independent adoption is final),
New Hampshire (until interlocutory decree), North Dakota (until final decree), and Ohio (until
interlocutory decree or, if none, until final decree). I ADOPTION LAW AND PRACTICE, supra
note 6, at app. I-A; Nat'l Council for Adoption, supra note 6; see, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §
25.23.070 (Michie 2004); HAW. REv. STAT. §§ 578-2(f), 578-12 (2003).
410. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 115-b(3)(a), (4)(a)(iv) (McKinney Supp. 2005).
411. ALA. CODE § 26-IOA-13 (1992).
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such a consent does not provide a basis to void it.'>412 In a case three years
earlier, the court found the mother's "alleged confusion concerning the
meaning and effect of the extrajudicial consent [was] insufficient to warrant
its vacatur.'>413
In best interests contests with prospective adoptive parents, mothers are
likely to fare poorly. As a Florida court cautioned rhetorically, "[h]ow many
parents could potentially be shown in a legal proceeding to be less good for
their children than certain other would-be adoptive parents if the courts were
empowered in such a proceeding to cause the adoption of children on that
basisT>414 Mothers are at a further disadvantage because a widespread failure
to expedite contested adoption litigation means that the child may have
remained with the adoptive parents for a lengthy period, developing an
attachment that will weigh against return of the child. "When the natural
mother changes her mind and litigation is instituted," a majority of the Idaho
Supreme Court observed, "there will be a considerable passage of time before
there is any resolution," during which "strong ties and emotional attachments"
form between the child and adoptive parents,4lS ties that will be "as traumatic,
if not more so" to sever than "the ties between the child and the natural
parents.'>416 A justice dissenting in part opposed the court's decision to
substitute a best interests standard for its previous estoppel rule.417 He wrote
that the delay is "wholly attributable to the system" and complained, "It
borders on the asinine for this Court to issue an opinion ... critical of the time
delay ... while at the same time it has not bothered to make any rule which
will expedite appeals in adoption cases.'>418
Mothers are often unmarried, less settled, and less prosperous than the
prospective adoptive parents. The attitudes they may face in court are
reflected in the statement of a prominent family law scholar: "The transaction
costs added by legislatures to protect natural parents' custodial rights and
ensure suitability of adoptive couples hurt more children than they assist.
Virtually all couples trying to adopt children are suitable.'>419 She continues,

412. In re AdoptionofBabyU., 693 N.Y.S.2d 118,120 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999)(emphasis
added).
413. In re Adoption ofJarrett, 637 N.Y.S.2d 912, 914 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996). Similarly,
mothers in cases in which adoptions would not be finalized for six months have claimed that
they thought they could reclaim their children during that period. See, e.g., Hohndorf v.
Watson, 482 N.W.2d 241, 242,244 (Neb. 1992).
414. In re Adoption of Baby Girl "C," 511 So. 2d 345, 346 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
415. In re B.D., 723 P.2d 829, 836 (Idaho 1986).
416. Id. at 834.
417. Id. at 839 (Bistline, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
418. Id. at 838 (Bistline, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
419. Margaret F. Brinig, The Effect o/Transactions Costs on the Market/or Babies, 18
SETON HALL LEGIS. 1.553,558-59 (1994). The focus of the article "veers away from natural
parental rights and moves toward what is in most cases de facto, rather than preemptively, best
for children." Id. at 559. In questioning "whether the focus on the rights of natural mothers is
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"'Best interests' cannot always function because a home with two loving
parents is the best placement for children-any other situation is always
second best.''''2o As discussed in Part IV, the prospective adoptive parents may
elicit greater sympathy than the mother, given the "adversity in their effort to
adopt children.''''21 The mother may face disapproval because she considered
placing her child for adoption and then changed her mind. As Gritter
observes:
How curious [it is] that one moment these critics admire her contemplation
of adoption and consider it a sign of maturity, and the next [moment] they
consider it a cause for concern. The proposed act that one day was regarded
as a "loving choice" is the next [day] referred to as "unloading
responsibility. ,,422
It appears from the generally brief analyses in reported appellate opinions
that mothers fare poorly in comparison with married, more settled, and more
prosperous prospective parents. In a 2000 New York case, for example, the
mother was described as "nomadic," while the adoptive parents had "stable
relationships.''''23 The evidence showed that "the biological mother had led a
nomadic, unstable life, while the adoptive parents demonstrated the ability to
establish and maintain continuous and stable relationships, and [were] far
better suited to meet the day-to-day and life-long physical, emotional, and
material needs of the child.''''24 In a 1989 case in Ohio, the court favored the
prospective adoptive parents' "ideal situation.''''25 Reversing the trial court's
best interests determination in favor of the mother, the appellate court
discussed relations with the father and among members of the mother's
family.426
It noted the prospective adoptive parents' reliance on a
psychologist's report that, "[w]hile not disparaging to the natural mother, ...
concluded that the natural mother's situation ... [did] not compare with the
almost ideal situation in which the adoptive parents [could] raise a child. ,"'27
The Tennessee Court of Appeals in a 1990 case affirmed a decision that
disfavored a single mother who was planning to work and go to school, relying

appropriate," the author simply assumes, without analysis, that a state system with a short
revocation period can guarantee voluntary consents-that "[0]nce the state guarantees that the
birth mother's consent is voluntarily made, a short revocation period will suffice." Id. at 578.
420. Id. at 560.
421. Id. at 564.
422. GRIITER, supra note 97, at 101; see generally Cahn, supra note 171 (examining past
and present cultural images of birth mothers).
423. In re Baby Boy M., 703 N.Y.S.2d 221, 222 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000).
424. Id.
425. In re Adoption ofInfant Boy, 573 N.E.2d 753,758 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989).
426. Id. at 757-58.
427. Id. at 758.
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on her mother for child care.428 The court compared the twenty-three-year-old
unwed mother, who was raising her first child and had placed a second child
in an open adoption, with the prospective adoptive parents, a thirty-year-old
ambulance driver and his forty-two-year-old homemaker wife, the mother of
a twenty-one-year-old son from a previous marriage. 429 The mother lived with
her parents, who had been under some financial strain, and she would have
had to depend on her mother to help look after her children,43o whereas the
adoptive parents could "provide [the infant] with a suitable home" and it was
"not contested that they [would] do their best for the child.,,431
Other opinions appear to focus simply on the fitness of the prospective
adoptive parents. Two recent Ohio appellate panels, approving trial courts'
best interests decisions in favor of adoptive parents, report only the findings
about the adoptive parents, findings that indicate stable marriages and
finances. The court in the 1999 case explains that the trial court did not abuse
its discretion because the adoptive parents "demonstrated to the trial court the
stability of their marriage and of [the father's] employment. [They] had
previously adopted, and were raising, a biracial child.'>432 In a 2003 case, the
appellate court stated that the trial court found the six-month-old child "had
bonded with the adoptive family, the child was thriving in her current
placement, the adoptive parents were financially stable and able to provide
stability and permanency, and both were in good health.'>433 Under Texas case
law, a mother's affidavit of relinquishment is itself "sufficient evidence on
which the trial court can base a finding that termination is in the best interest
of the child. ,>434
In contrast to most of the more recent opinions around the country, as well
as to subsequent New York statutory law,435 the approach described by the
New York Court of Appeals in the highly publicized 1971 Scarpetta case
favored mothers if they were not found to be unfit or to have improper
motivations: "In no case ... maya contest between a parent and nonparent
resolve itself into a simple factual issue as to which affords the better
surroundings, or as to which party is better equipped to raise the child. ,>436 The

428. In re Adoption of Griggs, No. 89-159-55, 1990 Tenn. App. LEXIS 35, at *4-5, *10
(Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 26, 1990).
429. Id. at *4-10.
430. See id. at *4, *10.
431. Id.at*10.
432. In re Infant Male Jackson, Nos. C-980077, C-990008, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 5179,
at *14 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 5, 1999).
433. In re Adoption of Baby Doe, No. 03AP-917, 2004 Ohio App. LEXIS 666, at *8 (Ohio
Ct. App. Feb. 17,2004).
434. Denman v. Alternatives in Motion, No. 14-99-01262-CV, 2001 Tex. App. LEXIS
336, at *4-5 (Tex. Ct. App. Jan. 18,2001).
435. See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 115-b(6)(d)(v) (McKinney Supp. 2005).
436. People ex rei. Scarpetta v. Spence-Chapin Adoption Serv., 269 N.E.2d 787,792 (N.Y.
1971).
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mother's change of mind "'is not an evil thing'" and "'is to be accorded great
sympathy, and, in a proper case, encouragement and favorable action. ",437

D. Unenforceable Open Adoption Agreements
Open adoption arrangements are preferred by many mothers considering
placing their infants for adoption. For these mothers, a promise of openness
may influence their decisions to place their children as well as their selection
of prospective adoptive parents. 438 In open adoption arrangements, adoptive
parents, and often adopted children, have contacts with birth parents through
photographs, letters, telephone calls, or visits. 439 Despite the increasing
publicity such arrangements are receiving and their apparently increasing
popularity, they are enforceable only to some degree and in some
circumstances in fewer than twenty states. 440 Some of the state statutes apply
only to adoptions of children from the child welfare system, to adoptions by
relatives, or to stepparent adoptions. 441 Under most of the statutes that make
agreements enforceable, the laws include a presumption that the agreements
are enforceable unless there are grounds for modification. 442
The potential problems are obvious when an open adoption agreement is
unenforceable. In a recent Texas case, the court held that a nineteen-year-old
mother's consent was involuntary and wrongfully procured because the
adoption agency's assurances that she would remain in the child's life were "at
worst deceptive and at best vague.'>443 There was no evidence that she "was
ever told that the post-adoption plan could not be legally enforced," and the
agency admitted in the litigation that the post-adoption plan was an "empty
promise.'>444 Similarly, a 1997 Kansas case appears to have been marked by
conflict and confusion regarding post-adoption contact. At a time when the

437. Id. (quoting People ex rei. Anonymous v. N.Y. Foundling Hosp., 232 N.Y.S.2d 479,
483 (N.Y. App. Div. 1962». The child in this case was not returned to the mother because the
prospective adoptive parents fled to Florida, where the courts, refusing to enforce the New York
custody order, found it was in the child's best interests to remain with the adoptive parents.
Scarp etta v. DeMartino, 254 So. 2d 813, 814 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971), cert. denied, 262 So.
2d 442 (Fla. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. lOll (1972).
438. See, e.g., PERTMAN, supra note 66, at 207-17; Suein L. Hwang, Us. Adoptions Get
Easier, WALL ST. J., Sept. 28, 2004, at DI; Gabrielle Glaser, Open Adoptions Bind Lives
Through a Baby, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Nov. 21, 2004, at 15; see also GRITTER, supra note 97, at
40-41 (discussing the potential emotional benefits of open adoptions).
439. CWLA STANDARDS, supra note 9, at 142.
440. Annette R. Appell, Enforceable Post-Adoption Contact Statutes: Part I: Adoption
with Contact, ADOPTION Q., Nov. 4, 2000, at 81, 82 (describing and comparing the various
adoption with contact statutes).
441. Id. at 84-86.
442. Id. at 84.
443. Vela v. Marywood, 17 S.W.3d 750, 753, 762, 764 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000).
444. Id. at 762.
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same attorney was representing both the birth mother and the prospective
adoptive parents,445 the birth mother discussed with the attorney her "wish to
have continued contact,,,446 although she knew that any agreement about
contact would not be legally binding.447 When the adoptive parents' attorney
later briefed her new, separate attorney, the attorney did not mention her wish
for contact. 448 She claimed in court that when she consented, "she believed
that the adopting parents had agreed to her future visitation[].'>449 The
appellate court affirmed the trial court's refusal to set aside her consent, noting
that there was "disputed evidence ... as to whether there was any agreement
regarding visitation" and that the adopting parents testified that there was no
such agreement. 450
VII. PRESCRIPTIONS

The best I can do is to repeat my sense that when independent
adoptions succeed they do so because they give expression to the
autonomous and informed decisions ofthe parties, and that the search
for ways to insure that those decisions are indeed autonomous and
informed is a critically important one. 451
Joan Heifetz Hollinger
Laws governing mothers' consents should aim not only to require but also
to create incentives for following best practices in adoption. In the litigation
described in Part VI, the states' legal systems apparently failed to do so. The
mothers often lacked accurate and complete information about the law, their
alternatives to adoption, and the effects they might experience after
relinquishing their children. The mothers lacked unbiased counseling services
or any counseling services at all. When they consented, they often had failed
to come to adequate understandings with the fathers of the children or with
family members. In almost all of the cases, they consented very shortly after
the birth, often in the hospital within hours or a few days after giving birth.

445. In re Adoption ofN.A.P., 930 P.2d 609, 617 (Kan. Ct. App. 1996).
446. Id. at 613.
447. Id.
448. See id. at 612.
449. Id. at 616.
450. Id. In an earlier Kansas case in which the mother was offered but did not have
separate counsel, the mother, before signing consent, asked the attorney why the documents did
not mention the visitation that she expected to have with the child. See In re Adoption of
J.H.G., 869 P.2d 640, 642 (Kan. 1994). He told her that "visitation was not supposed to be
addressed in the documents, but that it was an issue between her and the adoptive parents." Id.
In the lawsuit, in which the mother sought to set aside the adoption, the trial court found no
agreement had been reached between the parties except an agreement that there would be no
visitation for a minimum of six months after birth. See id. at 644.
451. Joan Heifetz Hollinger, Reflections on Independent AdoptiOns, in LEGALAoVOCACY
FOR CHILDREN AND YOUTH: REFORMS, TRENDS, AND CONTEMPORARY ISSUES 366,386 (1986).
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Legal safeguards are unnecessary for infant adoptions conducted in a
humane and ethical manner; they are essential for those that may not be. The
most critical observers argue that we should transform our diverse and
"[s]urprisingly loosely regulated,,452 system into a social service in which
The hope for such a
payments by adoptive parents play no part.
transformation seems quixotic in light of our long history of private agency
and independent adoptions, as well as the powerful, numerous, and entrenched
interests participating in the adoption market. As Pertman writes, "That's a
worthy ideal, but it's probably unrealistic in our devoutly capitalistic
society.'>453
A number of the available legal safeguards, short of transforming adoption
into a strictly social service, could be more widely enacted at little or no cost
to the states. Other legal safeguards, while worthwhile, are more costly and
complex, as well as inherently limited in their ability to promote deliberate
decisionmaking and finality. With respect to legal representation, states
should make clear by statute that attorneys may not simultaneously represent
adoptive parents and birth parents. This will help to ensure that birth parents
know that their interests are not and may not be represented by the adoptive
parents' attorney. It is not likely many states will decide to require separate
representation because of the costs that are involved either for the adoptive
parents or the state. In any event, although such representation presumably
makes it more likely a mother will understand her legal rights, there is also a
risk of a conflict of interest, as discussed in Part IV, when the attorney is paid
by prospective adoptive parents. If more mothers decide to place their
children for adoption, more work will be available for all attorneys involved
in adoptions.
Regardless of possible conflicts of interest, it is difficult to legislate the
timing and quality of representation that a pregnant woman or a new mother
will receive. The Kansas Court of Appeals found that its state law requiring
representation for young mothers had been complied with in a case in which
the prospective adoptive parents' attorney "less than an hour before the
scheduled meeting [for signing consents] ... realized that under Kansas law,
[the birth parents] were to be provided independent legal counsel.'>454 An
attorney whose office was in the same suite was enlisted and briefed for five
minutes. 4SS He then advised the birth parents and took their consents,456
satisfying the requirement that "a minor parent shall have the advice of
independent legal counsel as to the consequences of the consent or
relinquishment prior to its execution" and the attorney "shall be present at the

452.
453.
454.
455.
456.

Zeidler, supra note 65.
PERTMAN, supra note 66, at 194.
N.A.P., 930 P.2d at 612.
Id.
Id.
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execution.,,457 As a concurring North Dakota Supreme Court justice wrote,
"[m]eeting with the client immediately before a termination of parental rights
hearing for the first and only time does not allay the perception of lack of
independent counsel. It fortifies my concern that providing counsel under
such circumstances is but a perfunctory observance of a meaningless ritual.'>458
With respect to counseling services, there is at least potential utility in
requiring that a number of counseling sessions be available, that the sessions
be with a licensed social worker or therapist, and that the sessions be available
both well in advance of giving consent and after consenting. Skilled and
unbiased counseling is, as discussed in Part IV, an essential part of best
practices. But as explained and illustrated at length above, this kind of
counseling is far from guaranteed by most state law requirements. There are
risks of conflicts of interest when the counseling is offered or arranged by the
agency or individual handling the adoption, as well as when it is offered by
other providers paid by the prospective adoptive parents. California attempts
to minimize, but does not eliminate, this risk with statutory requirements.
Birth parents in independent adoptions must be advised of their rights and
offered three separate counseling sessions by an "adoption service
provider,,,459 defined as a licensed agency or a licensed clinical social worker
with five years of relevant experience. 460 The counselor who advises the birth
parents must not have any "contractual relationship with the adoptive parents,
an attorney for the adoptive parents, or any other individual or . . .
organization performing any type of services for the adoptive parents and for
which the adoptive parents are paying a fee, except as relates" to the fee for
the counseling. 461 These requirements add costs. When a state strictly
regulates counselors' qualifications, services, and affiliations, or itselfprovides
counseling services, the state imposes or incurs substantial costs, a fact that
helps explain why other states have not adopted such measures and why they
are unlikely to do so.
Increased costs and potential delays also reduce the number of states that
would consider joining the ten states that still employ in some or all
independent adoptions a procedure in which mothers appear in court to
relinquish parental rights or give their consent.
This procedure is
457. Id. at 614.
458. In re D.J.H., 40 1 N.W.2d 694, 703-04 (N.D. 1987) (Levine, J., concurring specially).
459. CAL. FAM. CODE § 8801.5(a), (d) (West 2004). The provider must also offer to
interview the birth parent within ten working days after the placement of the child and
immediately notify the state or delegated county agency if the birth parent is not interviewed
or ifthere are any concerns regarding the placement. CAL. FAM. CODE § 8801.7(a)-(b) (West
2004). The provider must assist the birth parent in obtaining return of the child if the birth
parent wishes to revoke the consent. CAL. FAM. CODE § 8801.7(b).
460. CAL. FAM. CODE § 8502(a)(l)-(2) (West Supp. 2005). Ifa service provider is not
reasonably available, as defined by the statute, "independent legal counsel for the birth parent
may serve as an adoption service provider." CAL. FAM. CODE § 8502(b).
461. CAL. FAM. CODE § 8801.5(e).
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recommended as a key, if imperfect, safeguard by Hollinger,462 and its efficacy
is suggested by the relative paucity of reported disputes in which the procedure
was employed. Vermont added this procedure in a 1995 overhaul of its
adoption law. 463 The state now requires that consents to adoption by
individuals and relinquishments to agencies must be signed in the presence of
"a judge of a court that has jurisdiction over adoption proceedings" or "a
person appointed by a probate judge to take consents or relinquishments. ,,464
If the consent is executed by a minor, it must "be signed in the presence of the
judge before whom the proceeding is pending.'>465
As suggested by the Part VI analyses of problems in practice, two of the
most effective and practicable safeguards in the case of infant adoptions are
similar to effective safeguards in the very different case of consumer
contracts: 466 information requirements and consent timing rules. At very low
cost, states can, and some states do, require that specific information be
provided at specified times, orally and in specific written formats, and that
provision and receipt of the information be confirmed in writing. For
example, Vermont requires, among other things, that (1) a parent "shall have
been informed of the meaning and consequences of adoption" and "the
availability of personal and legal counseling";467 (2) the person before whom
the consent or relinquishment is executed must certify both that he or she
orally explained the contents and consequences of executing the document and
that the person signing the consent read or was read the document and was
offered a copy;468 and (3) the consent contain "specific instructions as to how
462. Hollinger advises:
The attention of lawmakers should be directed . . . at insuring that consents, when
executed, are consents.
Perhaps in all adoptions-agency as well as
independent-voluntary relinquishments should be executed before a neutral party (judge?
court officer?) who not only witnesses the signing offorms, but more importantly, queries
the birth parent about her understanding of the consequences of her action. Risks are
posed, however, even by this procedure. Not the least of these is that the birth mother's
resolve to relinquish her child will be subject to extensive and inappropriate scrutiny.
Hollinger, supra note 451, at 377-78.
463. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A, § 2-405 historical note (2002).
464. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A, § 2-405(a).
465. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A, § 2-405(b).
466. See, e.g., THEODORE EISENBERG ET AL., DEBTOR-CREDITOR LAW § 1.08 (Theodore
Eisenberg ed., 2004) (describing truth in lending rescission rights for credit transactions in
which a home is taken as collateral, other than transactions for purchase of the home). The
contrast between consumer law protections and some adoption consent provisions was pointed
out in a Florida decision: "It is ironic that a potential condominium purchaser's contract with
a developer is voidable within 15 days from the date of execution." Hindman v. Bischoff, 534
So. 2d 743, 745 n. * (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
467. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A, § 2-404(e) (2002).
468. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A, § 2-405(d);seea/so VT.STAT.ANN. tit. 15A, § 2-406(2002)
(specifying what information and what kind of statements must be contained in consents and
relinquishments).
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to revoke the consent or relinquishment.,>469 Florida's statute is an example of
a law that includes a disclosure form, which must be provided to all
prospective birth and adoptive parents and includes statements about legal
representation, consents, alternatives to adoption, and the right to
counseling. 470 California's statute directs its Department of Social Services to
"prescribe the format and process for advising birth parents of their rights" and
to include specific information about alternatives to adoption, alternative types
of adoptions, and rights to legal representation and counseling. 471
Even more effective than information requirements, and equally
practicable, are rules that prohibit giving hasty irrevocable consents. Such
rules require no or only modest expenditures. In the period after birth and
before consent is final, an infant may be cared for by the mother, the father, or
both parents, either independently or with assistance, or by foster parents.
Proponents of very quick irrevocable consents have not demonstrated either
short-term or long-term harm from a period of a few days or weeks between
a child's birth and placement in an adoptive home.472 In any event, such
speedy consents are not necessary for early placements into adoptive homes.
If a child's parents and the prospective adoptive parents are confident that the
parents' decisions are final, and if they all wish for an early placement, the
child's parents can place the child in the adoptive home before consent has
been given or becomes final. 473 Speedy consents are also unnecessary to
ensure suitable adoptive placements for children, given the great demand for
healthy newborns. 474
Prohibiting hasty consents creates incentives for service providers to
follow best practices in adoption. Service providers and prospective adoptive
parents face potentially great costs, financial and emotional, when a mother
who has tentatively agreed to adoption decides not to place her child. The

469. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A, § 2-406(a)(5).
470. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.085 (West Supp. 2005).
471. CAL. FAM. CODE § 8801.5 (West 2004).
472. See supra Part IV.
473. For example, the Uniform Adoption Act specifies procedures for placement of a child
before a consent is executed:
[T]he parent or guardian who places the minor shall furnish to the prospective adoptive
parent a signed writing stating that the transfer of physical custody is for purposes of
adoption and that the parent or guardian has been informed of the provisions ofthis [Act]
relevant to placement for adoption, consent, relinquishment, and termination of parental
rights. The writing must authorize the prospective adoptive parent to provide support and
medical and other care for the minor pending execution of the consent within a time
specified in the writing. The prospective adoptive parent shall acknowledge in a signed
writing responsibility for the minor's support and medical and other care and for returning
the minor to the custody of the parent or guardian if the consent is not executed within the
time specified.
UNIF. ADOPTION ACT §2-102(d), 9 U.L.A. 31 (1992).
474. See supra Part III.
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chance she will do so is greatest if she has been inadequately counseled or
improperly pressured but then is afforded adequate time to consider and to
reconsider her decision. Therefore, if hasty consents are not permitted,
adoption services providers and prospective adoptive parents have a powerful
incentive to follow best practices from the outset. These practices facilitate
deliberate decisionmaking and make adoption more of a cooperative process
than a proprietary tussle. In other words, prohibiting hasty consents promotes
best practices among those who might be most tempted to disregard
them-whether for philosophical, religious, emotional, or financial
reasons-in order to meet the compelling desires of prospective adoptive
parents.
The most advantageous laws provide both a period of time after birth
before which consent may be given and a subsequent period of time for
revocation. Mothers who feel they have sufficiently deliberated and firmly
decided on adoption may give their legal consent not long after birth and then
choose to neither entertain nor exercise their right to revoke. They may "walk
away," knowing that the adoption will be completed without further
participation on their part. For mothers in less favorable circumstances, the
revocation period offers an opportunity for reflection as they recover from
giving birth and begin to experience the effects that the decision will have on
themselves and their families. To successfully provide an opportunity for
reflection, the right to revoke must be unqualified. Any period of time during
which withdrawing consent could trigger a best interest contest should come
after the period during which the mother has an unqualified right to revoke her
consent.
To determine the optimal periods of time, there is no magic formula that
perfectly balances the need for deliberate and final decisions with the need to
establish children in permanent homes. Vermont departed from the trend in
some states to shorten periods. In Vermont, mothers may not consent until
thirty-six hours after the birth, and they have a twenty-one-day revocation
period after they give consent. 475 If the period before a mother may consent
is four to seven days, most mothers will be out of the hospital, free of the
strongest effects of medication, and probably more sensible of their right not
to place their children despite any tentative arrangements made before birth.
If the subsequent, unqualified revocation period is approximately three weeks,
the total period of approximately four weeks will still be shorter than the
period in the Australian and European models described in Part II, and shorter
than the postpartum period of six to eight weeks between birth and the time
when the mother's body has returned as closely as possible to its pre-pregnant
state. 476 It may, nevertheless, be long enough for most mothers to recover
from the effects of childbirth and long enough for counteracting to some extent

475.
476.
2003).
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a lack of adequate information, family consultation, or supportive counseling.
VIII. CONCLUSION

Infant adoptions are momentous, life altering events, not only for the child
and both sets of parents, but also for the extended families. The future of any
adoptive family is just as uncertain as it is for any biological family. We
cannot predict how a child's personality, interests, and talents will mesh with
those of the child's parents and siblings, or how a child will respond to having
been placed for adoption. We cannot know what opportunities a family will
enjoy and what challenges it will face. Adoptive families, like biological
families, are unfortunately not immune from divorce, death, emotional
instability, substance abuse, and violence. When a state places its legal
imprimatur on the unmaking of one family and the making of another, the state
should at least insure to the greatest extent possible that all the individuals
involved have followed or have been afforded "best practices." These are the
practices that ethics and humanity demand. For mothers considering placing
their children for adoption, skilled, unbiased counseling is invaluable;
complete, well-communicated information is indispensable; and time is,
perhaps, "the wisest counsellor of all. ,,477
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